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COVINGTON v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: JUDICIAL CLOUDING OF A
ONCE CLEAR BURDEN OF PROOF IN AWARDS OF ATTORNEY FEES
UNDER 42 U.S.C. SECTION 1988
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, in the United States the party prevailing in a legal ac-
tion is not entitled to recover attorney fees from the losing party.1 This
principle is known as the "American Rule" and stands in diametric opposi-
tion to the "English Rule," which allows a prevailing party to recover attor-
ney fees.2 Although the American Rule is the standard throughout the
1. Jane M. Kravcik, The D.C. Circuit Revises Its Test for Determining a Reasonable
Hourly Rate, 57 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1122, 1123 (1989); seeM. Isabel Medina, Com-
ment, Award of Attorney Fees in Bad Faith Breaches of Contract in Louisiana-An Argu-
mentAgainst the American Rule, 61 TUL. L. Rtv. 1173, 1175-77 (1987) (tracing roots
of this tradition back to colonial separation from England). Medina explains that:
Early American courts awarded costs, which included attorney fees, to
winning litigants. Several factors, however, combined to reverse this early
approach, one of the English legal practices imported to the colonies.
First, strong resentment against British ideas, practices, and procedures
was an almost inevitable result of the tension between the colonies and
the mother country. One manifestation of this aversion to British prac-
tice was an increasing dislike and distrust of attorneys. Second, and of
perhaps more significance, a strong strain of individualism pervaded
early American culture and philosophy. This intense colonial individual-
ism fostered a view of litigation that popularized the image of a solitary
folk-hero fighting for his rights.
Id.; see alsoJohn V. Tunney, Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access
to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 636, 641 (1974) (stating that "[t]his conscious
attempt to purge English traditions from the American legal system, taken with
fierce frontier individualism, made it unlikely that America would adopt a rule
which routinely awarded attorney's fees").
2. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).
Under the "American Rule," the prevailing litigant cannot ordinarily collect attor-
ney fees from the losing party. Id. International judicial systems, however, do not
conform to this rule. Id. Most countries throughout the Western world adhere to
the "English Rule." James W. Hughes & Edward A. Snyder, Litigation and Settlement
Under the English and American Rules: Theory and Evidence, 38 J.L. & ECON. 225
(1995). The English Rule requires the losing party to pay, within a reasonable
limit, the prevailing party's legal fees. See id. at 225, 227 (explaining that "English
rule causes litigants to increase their legal expenditures").
Although American jurisprudence is mainly based upon English common law,
the American judicial system abandoned the practice of awarding attorney fees
during its formative years. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 247-48. Although the common law
historically did not permit courts to award litigation costs, for "centuries in Eng-
land there has been statutory authorization to award costs, including attorneys'
fees." Id. at 247 n.18 (noting that as early as 1278, English courts had statutory
authority to award attorney fees to successful plaintiffs, and by 1607, successful
defendants had similar statutory right to fees and costs).
During this country's formative years, the United States Congress authorized
federal courts to follow the practice of awarding attorney fees. Id. at 247-48. By
(825)
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United States, numerous statutes have carved out specific exceptions
throughout the years.3
In particular, Congress enacted one such exception in 1976, with its
passage of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act. 4 Section 1988(b)
1800, however, Congress had abandoned all of these statutes. Id. at 249. As a
result, the American Rule, began to take hold. Id. Today, while this general rule is
firmly entrenched, many statutory exceptions to the American Rule now exist, in-
cluding section 1988 of the Civil Rights Act of 1976. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994).
3. See Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478
U.S. 546, 561-62 (1986) (Citizens' Council) (stating that there are over 100 sepa-
rate statutes providing for award of attorney fees); see, e.g., Freedom of Information
Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4) (E) (1994); Clayton (Anti-Trust) Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 26 (1994); Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (a) (3) (1994); Equal Access to
Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1994); Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 406(b)(1) (A) (1994); Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(1)(e) (1994);
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, amending Civil Rights Act of 1866,
Revised Statutes Section 722, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994); Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1994); Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42
U.S.C. § 36 12 (p) (1994).
For a detailed discussion of the early statutes allowing for awards of attorney
fees, see Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 248 n.19.
The Supreme Court in Alyeska reaffirmed the notion that the judicial branch
does not have the power to create an exception to the American Rule. Id. at 249-
50 n.20. The Supreme Court cited a case dating back to 1796, where the Court
overturned the inclusion of attorney's fees as damages, and declared "that '(t)he
general practice of the United States is in opposition (sic) to it; and even if that
practice were not strictly correct in principle, it is entitled to the respect of the
court, till it is changed, or modified by, statute."' Id. (quoting Arcambel v. Wise-
man, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796) (emphasis added)); see Key Tronic Corp. v.
United States, 114 S. Ct. 1960, 1967 (1994) (noting that "efficacy of an exception
to the American Rule is a policy decision that must be made by Congress") (citing
FMC Corp. v. Aero Industries, Inc., 998 F.2d 842, 847 (1993)); see also Save Our
Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1516, 1525 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
("SOCM") (Starr, J., dissenting) (stating that "[i]n the thirteen years since the
Supreme Court's decision in Alyeska . . . federal law has moved haltingly in the
direction of the venerable English Rule with respect to the award of attorney's
fees").
Notwithstanding the above, federal courts recognize three judicially created
exceptions to the American Rule. Chambers v. Nasco, 501 U.S. 32, 45 (1991) (cit-
ing Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 257-59). These include: first, the "common fund excep-
tion," derived from historic equity jurisdiction; second, in cases where a party
exhibits "willful disobedience of a court order;" and third, where a party has acted
in "bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons." Id.
Recently, Congress considered legislation to change the American Rule.
Although the Republican Party's "Contract with America" included an absolute
"loser pays" provision, the House of Representitives passed a less stringent version
on March 7, 1995. House OKs Bill to Cut Lawsuits-It Would Put Pressure on Parties to
Settle Before Trail, STAR Tpm. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Mar. 8, 1995, at Al. The
adopted legislation "is more of a measure designed to bring enormous pressure on
both sides in a suit to settle before reaching court." See id. (explaining that "bill
would apply only to so-called diversity suits, those suits that are in federal courts
because they involve the laws of two states and the damages being sought exceed
$50,000"); see also Products Liability Merits Bipartisan Support, ATLANTA J., Mar. 6,
1995, at A8 (noting that "loser pays" is most controversial provision in tort reform).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994). Section 1988(b) contains a fee shifting provision
which provides in relevant part:
[Vol. 41: p. 825
2
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol41/iss3/8
1996] NOTE 827
of this Act allows the trial court to shift "reasonable attorney's fees" to the
prevailing party at its discretion. 5 The united States Supreme Court has
interpreted section 1988(b) to require a trial court to complete a two-step
process before awarding attorney fees.6 First, the trial court must calculate
the "lodestar."7 This calculation is merely the product of the number of
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981,
1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-
318 [20 U.S.C. § 1681], the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
[42 U.S.C. § 2000bb], title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d], or section 13981 of this title, the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable at-
torney's fee as part of the costs.
42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).
5. Id.; see Chambers, 501 U.S. at 55 (stating that Supreme Court reviews court's
award of attorney fees under abuse of discretion standard); Carroll v. Wolpoff &
Abramson, 53 F.3d 626, 628 (4th Cir. 1995) (affirming that Fourth Circuit reviews
awards of attorney fees under abuse of discretion standard); Mares v. Credit Bu-
reau of Raton, 801 F.2d 1197, 1200-01 (10th Cir. 1986) (revealing that Tenth Cir-
cuit reviews awards of attorney fees under abfise of discretion standard); Grendel's
Den, Inc. v. Larkin, 749 F.2d 945, 950 (1st Cir. 1984) (announcing that First Cir-
cuit reviews awards of attorney fees under abuse of discretion standard); Rosario v.
Amalgamated Ladies' Garment Cutters' Union, 749 F.2d 1000, 1004 (2d Cir. 1984)
(holding that Second Circuit reviews awards of attorney fees under abuse of discre-
tion standard); Thornberry v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 676 F.2d 1240, 1242-43 (9th
Cir. 1982) (clarifying that Ninth Circuit reviews awards of attorney fees under
abuse of discretion standard), vacated, 461 U.S. 952 (1983); Copeland v. Marshall,
641 F.2d 880, 900-01 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc) (stating that District of Columbia
Circuit reviews awards of attorney fees under abuse of discretion standard).
6. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (explaining two-step
process); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 323-24 (5th Cir.
1995) (emphasizing that "determination of reasonable attorney's fees involves a
two-step procedure"), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 173 (1995); see also Carroll 53 F.3d at
627-28 (applying Hensley's two-step approach); Public Interest Research Group,
Inc. v. Windall, 51 F.3d 1179, 1181-82 (3d Cir. 1995) (same); Sands v. Runyon, 28
F.3d 1323, 1333 (2d Cir. 1994) (same); Metz v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482, 1493 (10th Cir. 1994) (same); Intel Corp. v. Terabyte
Int'l, Inc., 6 F.3d 614, 622-23 (9th Cir. 1993) (same); Loranger v. Stierheim, 10
F.3d 776, 781 (lth Cir. 1993) (same); Gekas v. Attorney Registration & Discipli-
nary Comm'n of Supreme Court of Illinois, 793 F.2d 846, 851-52 (7th Cir. 1986)
(same); Segal v. Gilbert Color Sys., Inc., 746 F.2d 78, 86 (1st Cir. 1984) (same);
United Slate, Tile and Composition Roofers Damp and Waterproof Workers Ass'n,
Local 307 v. G & M Roofing and Sheet Metal Co., 732 F.2d 495, 502-03 (6th Cir.
1984) (same); Premachandra v. Mitts, 727 F.2d 717, 732-33 (8th Cir. 1984) (same),
rev'd on other grounds, 753 F.2d 635 (8th Cir. 1985).
7. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 (explaining how to calculate attorney fee awards
while using definition of lodestar, but not using actual term). The United States
Supreme Court in Hensley, explained that "[t] he most useful starting point for de-
termining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably ex-
pended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate." Id. The sum of
these two figures is referred to as the "lodestar." Citizens' Council 478 U.S. at 563.
Courts may adjust the "lodestar" up or down, depending on the quality of an attor-
ney's work. Id. The Third Circuit first developed the "lodestar" approach in Lindy
Bros. Builders v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 167 (3d Cir.
1973), vacated on other grounds, 540 F.2d 102 (1976). Subsequently, the Hensley
Court adopted this approach, with some minor modifications. Citizens' Council
3
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hours reasonably worked by the attorneys and a reasonable hourly rate
charged for the legal services. 8 Second, once the court determines the
"lodestar" it may adjust this figure as the facts of the case warrant.9 The
subject of this Note, Covington v. District of Columbia,10 concerns the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia's application of sec-
tion 1988's fee shifting provision, and in particular, the court's determina-
tion of the relevant reasonable hourly rates."
This Note discusses the circumstances surrounding Covington and ex-
plores the accuracy of the court's determination of the applicable reason-
able hourly rates. 12 In particular, this Note examines the District of
Columbia Circuit's reliance on a matrix as specific evidence to prove the
market rate for reasonable attorney fees.' 3 Part II of this Note details the
development of jurisprudence concerning attorney fee awards.1 4 Part III
reviews the factual setting for the Covington opinion. 15 Furthermore, Part
IV examines the Covington court's analysis both in a narrative and critical
light.' 6 Finally, Part V contemplates the effect of Covington on future sec-
tion 1988 litigation, particularly iMn light of the emerging practice of pri-
vate civil rights litigation. 17
II. BACKGROUND
This Part examines the development of Supreme Court and circuit
court case law respecting the award of attorney fees under section
1988(b). 18 First, Section A sets the scene for Congress's passage of section
478 U.S. at 563-64 (noting that Hensley Court adopted "hybrid" approach, which
determines the "lodestar" first and then allows for adjustments).
8. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 (noting that "lodestar" is number of hours rea-
sonably expended multiplied by reasonable hourly rate).
9. See Citizens' Council 478 U.S. at 563 (explaining that "lodestar" may be ad-
justed depending on attorney's quality of work).
10. 57 F.3d 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 916 (1996).
11. Id. For a discussion of the facts of Covington, see infra notes 123-38 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the Covington court's analysis, see infra
notes 142-77 and accompanying text. For a critique of the Covington court's analy-
sis, see infra notes 178-201 and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of Supreme Court case law regarding reasonable rate de-
termination, see infra notes 29-63 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of the Covington court's reasonable rate calculation, see
infra notes 150-69 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the development of attorney fee awards case law, see
infra notes 18-122 and accompanying text.
15. For a review of the facts of Covington, see infra notes 123-38 and accompa-
nying text.
16. For an examination of the Covington court's analysis, see infra notes 142-77
and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the effect of the Covington opinion, see infra notes 202-
17 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the background of section 1988(b), see infra notes 18-
122 and accompanying text.
828
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1988(b). 19 Next, Section B details the Supreme Court's interpretation
and analysis of section 1988(b) attorney fee awards. 20 Finally, Section C
discusses the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and
the District of Columbia Circuit's jurisprudence regarding section
1988(b).21
A. Alyeska and the Birth of Section 1988
Since the early part of this century, as private attorneys began to play
a more prominent role in the enforcement of civil rights violations, fed-
eral courts began to recognize the attorneys' civil rights contributions by
awarding attorney fees to the prevailing parties. 22 Consequently, this "pri-
vate attorney general" trend led to the judicial amelioration of the Ameri-
can Rule, which denied the prevailing party in a legal action the right to
seek attorney fees from the losing party.23 On May 12, 1975, however, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed the American Rule and ended the prolifera-
tion of fee awards in federal courts in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilder-
ness Society.24 Soon thereafter, Congress responded to the Alyeska decision
by enacting the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 ("Act"). 25
Section 1988(b) of the Act authorizes courts to award attorney fees to
parties who prevail in actions to enforce civil rights under any one of its
many enumerated federal statutes. 26 The legislative history of section
1988(b) demonstrates that while Congress sought to attract "competent
counsel" for civil rights cases, it did not intend to create a "windfall" for
19. For a discussion of Congress's passage of section 1988(b), see infra notes
22-28 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's section 1988(b) case law, see
infra notes 29-63 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of circuit case law concerning interpreting section
1988(b), see infra notes 64-122 and accompanying text.
22. R. Walton Shelton, Relative Responsibility: A Proposed Methodology for Alloca-
tion of Attorneys'Fees in § 1988 Cases, 40 BAYLOR L. REv. 487, 489 (1988).
23. Id. The policy behind the "private attorney general" concept is that civil
rights litigation should not be discouraged, but encouraged. Id. In addition, if the
judicial system forced potential litigants to bear their own costs, many would be
unable or reluctant to seek judicial help. Id.
24. 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975). See generally Shelton, supra note 22, at 489 (not-
ing expansion of fee awards).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1994). The Senate Report explained the purpose of
section 1988(b):
This amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Revised Statutes Section
722, gives the Federal courts discretion to award attorneys' fees to prevail-
ing parties in suits brought to enforce the civil rights acts which Congress
has passed since 1866. The purpose of this amendment is to remedy
anomalous gaps in our civil rights laws created by the United States
Supreme Court's recent decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness
Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975), and to achieve consistency in our civil rights
laws.
S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 1, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CA.N. 5908, 5909.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1994). For the relevant text of section 1988(b) see
supra note 4.
1996] NOTE 829
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the attorneys. 2 7 Accordingly, section 1988(b) "filled the gap" created in
27. S. RP. No. 94-1011, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5913. This
Senate Report explains in relevant part:
S. 2278 [42 U.S.C. 1988(b)] ... is designed to allow courts to provide the
familiar remedy of reasonable counsel fees to prevailing parties in suits to
enforce the civil rights acts .... All of these civil rights laws depend
heavily upon private enforcement, and fee awards have proved an essen-
tial remedy if private citizens are to have a meaningful opportunity to
vindicate the important Congressional policies which these laws contain.
In many cases arising under our civil rights laws, the citizen who
must sue to enforce the law has little or no money with which to hire a
lawyer. If private citizens are to be able to assert their civil rights, and if
those who violate the Nation's fundamental laws are not to proceed with
impunity, then citizens must have the opportunity to recover what it costs
them to vindicate these rights in court.
The idea of the "private attorney general" is not a new one, nor are
attorneys' fees a new remedy. Congress has commonly authorized attor-
neys' fees in laws under which "private attorneys general" play a signifi-
cant role in enforcing our policies. We have, since 1870, authorized fee
shifting under more than 50 laws ....
The remedy of attorneys' fees has always been recognized as particu-
larly appropriate in the civil rights area, and civil rights and attorneys'
fees have always been closely interwoven. In the civil rights area, Con-
gress has instructed the courts to use the broadest and most effective rem-
edies available to achieve the goals of our civil rights laws. The very first
attorneys' fee statute was a civil rights law, the Enforcement Act of 1870,
16 Stat. 140, which provided for attorneys' fees in three separate provi-
sions protecting voting rights.
. (I]n Alyeska, the United States Supreme Court, while referring to
the desirability of fees in a variety of circumstances, ruled that only Con-
gress, and not the courts, could specify which laws were important
enough to merit fee shifting under the "private attorney general" the-
ory.... This decision and dictum created anomalous gaps in our civil
rights laws whereby awards of fees are, according to Alyeska, suddenly un-
available in the most fundamental civil rights cases. For instance, fees are
now authorized in an employment discrimination suit under Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, but not in the same suit brought under 42
U.S.C. 1981, which protects similar rights but involves fewer technical
prerequisites to the filing of an action ....
This bill, S. 2278 [42 U.S.C. 1988], is an appropriate response to the
Alyeska decision. It is limited to cases arising under our civil rights laws, a
category of cases in which attorneys' fees have been traditionally regarded
as appropriate. It remedies gaps in the language of these civil rights laws
by providing the specific authorization required by the Court in Alyeska,
and makes our civil rights laws consistent.
It is intended that the standards for awarding fees be generally the
same as under the fee provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act . ...
"[Pirivate attorneys general" should not be deterred from bringing good
faith actions to vindicate the fundamental rights here involved by the
prospect of having to pay their opponent's counsel fees should they
lose.... This bill thus deters frivolous suits by authorizing an award of
attorneys' fees against a party shown to have litigated in "bad faith" under
the guise of attempting to enforce the Federal rights created by the stat-
utes listed in S. 2278 ....
830
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Alyeska, by allowing the courts to continue the practice of awarding attor-
ney fees in civil rights litigation.
2 8
B. The Supreme Court and Section 1988
In the twenty years since Congress passed the Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Awards Act of 1976, federal courts of appeals have cited this statute in
over one hundred cases.2 9 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has only in-
terpreted this statute in a relatively small number of cases.30 Accordingly,
In several hearings held over a period of years, the Committee has
found that fee awards are essential if the Federal statutes to which S. 2278
[42 U.S.C. 1988] applies are to be fully enforced. We find that the effects
of such fee awards are ancillary and incident to securing compliance with
these laws, and that fee awards are an integral part of the remedies neces-
sary to obtain such compliance....
It is intended that the amount of fees awarded under S. 2278 [42
U.S.C. 1988] be governed by the same standards which prevail in other
types of equally complex Federal litigation, such as antitrust cases and not
be reduced because the rights involved may be nonpecuniary in nature.
The appropriate standards, see Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 488
F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974), are correctly applied in such cases as Stanford
Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal. 1974) [affd, 550 F.2d 464 (9th
Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, (436 U.S. 547 (1978))]; Davis v. County
of Los Angeles, 8 E.P.D. 9444 (C.D. Cal. 1974); and Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education, 66 F.R.D. 483 (W.D.N.C. 1975). These
cases have resulted in fees which are adequate to attract competent coun-
sel, but which do not produce windfalls to attorneys. In computing the
fee, counsel for prevailing parties should be paid, as is traditional with
attorneys compensated by a fee-paying client, "for all time reasonably ex-
pended on a matter."
S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 2-6, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5909-13 (footnotes
omitted); see Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478
U.S. 546, 565 (1986) (emphasizing that Congress did not intend for section
1988(b) to improve financial lot of attorneys by acting as form of economic relief).
28. See SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICI-
ARY, Source Book: Legislative History, Text and Other Documents; Civil Rights Attorneys'
Fees Awards Act of 1976, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-23 (1976) (noting statement by
Senator Kennedy: "[Section 1988(b)] is intended simply to expressly authorize the
courts to continue to make the kinds of awards of legal fees that they had been
allowing prior to the Alyeska decision").
29. Compare National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n,
115 S. Ct. 2351, 2353 (1995) (involving one of most recent cites to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988), with Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693 (1978) (involving one of earliest
cites to 42 U.S.C. § 1988); see also City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562
(1992) (noting that Supreme Court's interpretation of "reasonable" under one fee
shifting statute applies "uniformly to all" fee shifting statutes).
30. See Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82 (1990) (interpreting section 1988);
Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989) (same); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S.
87 (1989) (same); Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air,
483 U.S. 711 (1987) (same); North Carolina Dep't of Transp. v. Crest St. Commu-
nity Council, Inc., 479 U.S. 6 (1986) (same); Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citi-
zens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546 (1986) (same); City of Riverside v.
Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 (1986) (same); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985)
(same); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984) (same); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461
7
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this Section examines the cases in which the Court has molded and
shaped section 1988(b), focusing on the evolution of the Supreme Court's
interpretations of section 1988(b)'s intricacies.31
In 1983, the Supreme Court offered its first major interpretation of
section 1988(b) in Hensley v. Eckerhart.3 2 The Hensley Court held that dis-
trict courts should ordinarily award attorney fees to a prevailing party in a
civil rights action. 33 In addition, while the Hensley Court explained that
trial courts must determine an award based on the facts of each case, it
also emphasized that the most useful starting point to determine an award
is to calculate the "lodestar," which is the product of the number of hours
reasonably expended on the litigation and a reasonable hourly rate.34
U.S. 424 (1983) (same); Moor v. Alameda County, 411 U.S. 693 (1973) (same); see
also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (explaining that it is
Supreme Court's duty to interpret law). In Marbury, Justice Marshall explains that:
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of ne-
cessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each
other, the courts must decide on the operation of each.
So if a law be in opposition to the constitution: if both the law and
the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either
decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or
conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law: the court must de-
termine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the
very essence ofjudicial duty.
Id. at 177-78 (emphasis added).
31. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's interpretation of section 1988,
see infra notes 32-63 and accompanying text.
32. 461 U.S. 424, 426 (1983). In Hensey, Mr. Eckerhart brought a suit on
behalf of all persons involuntarily confined at a state hospital. Id. After a trial, the
district court found constitutional violations in five of the six areas it examined. Id.
at 427. Accordingly, Mr. Eckerhart sought to invoke section 1988(b)'s fee shifting
provision. Id. at 428. The district court awarded $133,332.25, and the Eight Cir-
cuit affirmed. Id. at 428-29.
33. Id. at 429. The Hensley Court, however, did recognize that the district
courts should not award attorney fees in the event that an award would be unjust.
Id. In addition, the Hensley Court held that a defendant may recover an award of
attorney fees if the suit was "vexatious, frivolous, or brought to harass or embarrass
the defendant." Id. at 429 n.2 (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1558, at 7 (1976)).
34. Id. at 433. While stressing the importance of the particular facts in each
case, the Court noted that Congress favorably cited to a twelve factor approach
applied by the Fifth Circuit in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714
(5th Cir. 1974). Hensley, 461 U.S. at 430 n.3. These factors are:
(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the
questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4)
the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the
case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent;
(7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the
amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputa-
tion, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the "undesirability" of the case;
(11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the cli-
ent; and (12) awards in similar cases.
Id. (citingJohnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19). For a discussion of the "lodestar" concept,
see supra notes 7-9 and infra notes 42-41, 64 and accompanying text.
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Under Hensley, plaintiffs recover attorney fees if they have "obtained
excellent results.13 5 This presumption of an award, however, does not
place the burden of proof on the defendant if the parties litigate a motion
for attorney fees.3 6 The Hensley Court held that if the parties cannot reach
a settlement, the fee applicant must establish its "entitlement to an award
and document[ ] the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates. '3 7 Fi-
nally, the Hensley Court emphasized that a district court must throughly
explain its reasoning, anytime it awards attorney fees. 3 8
Within one year of the Hensley decision, the Supreme Court clarified
the application of section 1988(b) in Blum v. Stenson.39 In Blum, the Court
35. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. To clarify its holding, the Hensley Court ex-
plained that "work on an unsuccessful claim cannot be deemed to have been 'ex-
pended in pursuit of the ultimate result achieved."' Id. at 435 (citations omitted).
Therefore, no attorney's awards are allowed to compensate for services on an un-
successful claim. Id. If, however, a plaintiff is only partially successful, then the
"lodestar" may be excessive because the "most crucial factor is the degree of suc-
cess obtained." Id. at 436.
36. See id. at 437 (emphasizing that ideally parties will come to agreement on
amount of fee without need for second major litigation). Recently, almost every
federal court of appeals has cited to this Hensley holding. See Bingham v. Zolt, 66
F.3d 553, 565 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1418 (1996) (citing Hensley's no
second major litigation holding); Hadix v. Johnson, 65 F.3d 532, 536 (6th Cir.
1995) (same); Florin v. Nationsbank of Georgia, NA., 60 F.3d 1245, 1246 (7th Cir.
1995) (beginning opinion by citing to Hensley's no second major litigation hold-
ing); Trimper v. City of Norfolk, 58 F.3d 68, 74 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 535 (1995) (same); Covington v. District of Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1107 (D.C.
Cir. 1995) (citing HensLey's no second major litigation holding); In re Thirteen Ap-
peals Arising Out Of the San Juan DuPont Plaza Hotel Fire Litigation, 56 F.3d 295,
301 (1st Cir. 1995); (same); Friends of Boundary Waters Wilderness v. Thomas, 53
F.3d 881, 883 (8th Cir. 1995) (same); Bell v. Schexnayder, 36 F.3d 447, 449 (5th
Cir. 1994); (same); Beard v. Teska, 31 F.3d 942, 958 (10th Cir. 1994) (same); In re
Rasbury, 24 F.3d 159, 167 (11th Cir. 1994) (same); Brewster v. Dukakis, 3 F.3d 488,
493 (1st Cir. 1993) (same).
37. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. The Court explained that this requires an appli-
cant to exercise good "billing judgment" and to maintain billing time records in a
fashion which will allow a court to segregate the distinct claims. Id. Federal Courts
of Appeals apply this same guideline. See, e.g., Trimper, 58 F.3d at 74 (requiring fee
applicant to exercise good billing judgment); Building Serv. Local 47 v. Grandview
Raceway, 46 F.3d 1392, 1402 (6th Cir. 1995) (same); Lunday v. City of Albany, 42
F.3d 131, 133-34 (2d Cir. 1994) (same); Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 780
(11th Cir. 1994) (same); Pearson v. Fair, 980 F.2d 37, 47 (1st Cir. 1992) (same);
Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992) (same); Smith v. Free-
man, 921 F.2d 1120, 1122 (10th Cir. 1990) (same).
38. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437 (noting that "the district court should make
clear that it has considered the relationship between the amount of the fee
awarded and the results obtained").
39. 465 U.S. 886 (1984). Blum involved an action between a statewide class of
Medicaid recipients and the State of New York over the implementation of the
Supplemental Security Income program. Id. at 889. The district court settled the
underlying claim based on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment. Id.
The court awarded the total amount requested, $118,968, which included a fifty
percent "bonus" because of the great benefit to society. Id. at 891. Subsequently,
the Second Circuit released an unpublished opinion affirming the award. Id. at
891-92.
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explained that district courts must calculate reasonable fees "according to
the prevailing market rates in the relevant community, regardless of
whether plaintiff is represented by private or nonprofit counsel.140 In ad-
dition, the Blum Court held that an applicant must show "that the re-
quested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar
services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputa-
tion. '4 1 The Blum Court concluded that trial courts may adjust the "lode-
star," but only in the rare cases where the fee applicant offers "specific
evidence" showing that the attorney performed superior services. 42
40. Id. at 895. Here, the Court reasoned that the legislative history does not
support a position that Congress sought to vary awards depending upon whether a
party was represented by private counsel, or by a "nonprofit legal service." Id. at
894. As a result, the Court concluded that before district courts are permitted to
utilize a cost-based approach, the authority to do so must come from Congress, not
the judiciary. Id. at 895-96.
41. See id. at 895 n.lI (reaffirming that burden of proof is on fee applicant to
produce sufficient evidence). In a footnote, the Court shed light on an issue
which subsequently ripened in Covington. Id.; see Covington, 57 F.3d at 1107 (con-
cerning necessary proof of reasonable rate). In particular, the Blum Court ex-
plained that:
We recognize, of course, that determining an appropriate "market rate"
for the services of a lawyer is inherently difficult. Market prices of com-
modities and most services are determined by supply and demand. In
this traditional sense there is no such thing as a prevailing market rate for
the service of lawyers in a particular community. The type of services
rendered by lawyers, as well as their experience, skill, and reputation, var-
ies extensively-even within a law firm. Accordingly, the hourly rates of
lawyers in private practice also vary widely. The fees charged often are
based on the product of hours devoted to the representation multiplied
by the lawyer's customary rate. But the fee usually is discussed with the
client, may be negotiated, and it is the client who pays whether he wins or
loses. The § 1988 fee determination is made by the court in an entirely
different setting: there is no negotiation or even discussion with the pre-
vailing client, as the fee-found to be reasonable by the court-is paid by
the losing party. Nevertheless, as shown in the text above, the critical
inquiry in determining reasonableness is now generally recognized as the
appropriate hourly rate. And the rates charged in private representations
may afford relevant comparisons. In seeking some basis for a standard,
courts properly have required prevailing attorneys to justify the reasona-
bleness of the requested rate or rates. To inform and assist the court in
the exercise of its discretion, the burden is on the fee applicant to pro-
duce satisfactory evidence-in addition to the attorney's own affidavits-
that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the commu-
nity for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experi-
ence and reputation. A rate determined in this way is normally deemed
to be reasonable, and is referred to-for convenience-as the prevailing
market rate.
Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n.11; see also City of Burlington v. Dauge, 505 U.S. 557, 563
(1992) (explaining that "lodestar" concept has "become the guiding light of our
fee shifting jurisprudence").
42. Blum, 465 U.S. at 896-99. The Blum Court found that many of the twelve
factors enumerated in Johnson, are represented in the lodestar determination. Id.
at 897 n.13 (citingJohnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19
(5th Cir. 1974)). As a result, the Blum Court explained that district courts are not
834 [Vol. 41: p. 825
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Following Blum, the Supreme Court in North Carolina Department of
Transportation v. Crest Street Community Council, Inc.,43 addressed whether
section 1988(b) permitted a party to seek attorney fees in an action sepa-
rate and apart from the proceeding in which the party sought to enforce a
civil rights claim. 44 The Crest Street Court concluded that section 1988(b)
only allows an award of attorney fees in an action to enforce a civil right
under one of its many enumerated statutes.45 In doing so, the Crest Street
Court reasoned that an award of attorney fees depends not only upon the
results obtained, but also on what actions the parties took to achieve the
results.
46
to award attorney fees based soley on an examination of each individual factor. Id.
at 900. To do so, the Court concluded, would be "double counting." Id. at 899.
Accordingly, the Blum Court rejected the fifty percent "bonus" award and the
double counting. Id. at 900-01; see Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Coun-
cil for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565 (1986) (stating that fee shifting statutes "were
not designed as a form of economic relief to improve the financial lot of
attorneys").
The Blum Court, however, did not discuss under which circumstances a trial
court may change a rate to one other than the rate requested "when that re-
quested rate is not only the attorney's billing rate, but is also 'in line with' rates
prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers who are reasonably
comparable." Islamic Center of Miss., Inc. v. City of Starkville, 876 F.2d 465, 469
n.8 (5th Cir. 1989) (comparing Thompson v. Kennickell, 836 F.2d 616, 620 (D.C.
Cir. 1988); Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community v. City of Prior Lake, 771
F.2d 1153, 1159-61 (8th Cir. 1985); andLaffeyv. Northwest Airlines, 746 F.2d 4, 25
(D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1021 (1985), overruled in part by, SOCM, 857
F.2d at 1518-24, with SOCM, 857 F.2d at 1524; Student Public Interest Research
Group v. AT&T Bell Lab., 842 F.2d 1436, 1443-50 (3d Cir. 1988); Norman v. Hous-
ing Auth., 836 F.2d 1292, 1299-1301 (lth Cir. 1988); Lightfoot v. Walker, 826
F.2d 516, 524-25 (7th Cir. 1987); Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel, 826
F.2d 43, 55-60 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Wald, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part),
modified in part, 857 F.2d 1516 (1988) (en banc); and Neely v. City of Grenada, 624
F.2d 547, 550-51 (5th Cir. 1980)).
43. 479 U.S. 6 (1986).
44. Id. at 12. In Crest Street, residents of an established and predominantly
black area of Durham, North Carolina, sought the help of the North Central Legal
Assistance Program in an effort to prevent the extension of a highway through
their neighborhood. Richard Gans, The Supreme Court's Interpretation of Section 1988
and Awards of Attorney's Fees for Work Performed in Administrative Proceedings: A Proposal
for Result-Oriented Approach-North Carolina Department of Transportation v. Crest
Street Community Council, Inc., 62 WASH. L. REv. 889, 894 (1987). After success-
fully blocking the proposed construction, the residents filed a separate complaint
seeking attorney fees. Crest Street, 479 U.S. at 11. Although the district court dis-
missed the complaint, the Fourth Circuit reversed the decision. Id.
45. Crest Street, 479 U.S. at 12. The Crest Street Court noted that the "legislative
history is replete with references to 'the enforcement of the civil rights statutes "in
suits," "through the courts" and by 'judicial process.""' Id. (citing Webb v. Board
of Educ., 471 U.S. 234, 241 n.16 (1985) (quoting S. REp. No. 94-1011, at 2-6, re-
printed in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5909-13)).
46. Id. at 14. The Crest Street Court, however, did recognize that time spent on
administrative proceedings to enforce a civil rights claim prior to any litigation
may still be covered by section 1988(b). Id. at 15; see Gans, supra note 44, at 890
(noting that Court "did not discuss the availability of attorney's fees awards under
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Subsequent to its decision in Crest Street, and in an attempt to resolve a
split among the federal courts of appeals regarding section 1988(b)'s com-
patibility with contingency fees, the Supreme Court again examined this
fee shifting provision in Blanchard v. Bergeron.47 The Blanchard Court fo-
cused on the way in which a contingency fee arrangement impacts an at-
torney fee award.48 In particular, the Blanchard Court held that a
compensation arrangement based on a contingency fee does not affect an
award of attorney fees.49 The, Blanchard Court stated that a reasonable
attorney fee "contemplates reasonable compensation, in light of all of the
circumstances, for the time and effort expended by the attorney for the
prevailing plaintiff, no more and no less."'50
section 1988 for negotiations subsequent to the filing of an administrative
complaint").
47. 489 U.S. 87 (1989). In Blanchard, Arthur Blanchard brought a suit alleg-
ing that the Sheriffs Deputy, Bergeron, beat him while he was patronizing
Oudrey's Odyssey Lounge. Id. at 88. After a trial, the jury awarded Blanchard
$5,000 in compensatory damages and $5,000 in punative damages. Id. at 89. Sub-
sequently, Deputy Blanchard invoked section 1988's fee shifting provision, with an
attorney's fees motion for more than $40,000. Id. The district court, however,
awarded Deputy Blanchard $8,386.92. Id. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reduced
the award, reasoning that Deputy Blanchard had entered into a contingency fee
agreement. Id. at 90. The Fifth Circuit's holding, however, was not consistent with
holdings from other circuits. See Cooper v. Singer, 719 F.2d 1496, 1507 (10th Cir.
1983) (holding contingency fee agreement does not limit section 1988(b) award),
overruled in part on other grounds by, Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82, 84 n.1 (1990);
Sisco v.J.S. Alberici Constr. Co., 733 F.2d 55, 56 (8th Cir. 1984) (same); Sanchez v.
Schwartz, 688 F.2d 503, 505 (7th Cir. 1982) (same).
Next, the Blanchard Court recognized that the Fifth Circuit was not the only
circuit to hold that a contingency fee arrangement governs a section 1988(b) fee
award. Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 90 n.4; see Pharr v. Housing Auth. of Prichard, 704
F.2d 1216 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that contingency fee agreement governs in
section 1988(b) fee award), overruled in part by, Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 90 n.4 (1989).
48. Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 96. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY defines contingent
fees as:
Arrangement between attorney and client whereby attorney agrees to rep-
resent client with compensation to be a percentage of the amount recov-
ered; e.g., 25% if the case is settled, 30% if the case goes to trial.
Frequently used in personal injury actions. Such fee arrangements are
often regulated by court rule or statute depending on the type of action
and amount of recovery; and are not permitted in criminal cases.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 614 (6th ed. 1990).
49. Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 90, 96. The Blanchard Court noted that some fed-
eral courts of appeals concluded that a section 1988(b) fee award should not be
limited by a contingency fee arrangement. Id. at 90 & n.4. See, e.g., Cooper, 719
F.2d at 1507 (stating that contingency fee agreement does not limit section
1988(b) attorney fee award).
50. Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 93. The Court hypothesized that where a lawyers'
organization agrees to take a case without compensation, section 1988(b) does not
prohibit that organization from recovering reasonable fees. Id. at 94. The
Blanchard Court explained, "[t] lat a nonprofit legal services organization may con-
tractually have agreed not to charge any fee of a civil rights plaintiff does not pre-
clude the award of a reasonable fee to a prevailing party in a § 1983 action,
calculated in the usual way." Id. at 95.
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Less than three months after the Blanchard decision, the Supreme
Court examined the constitutional questions surrounding the application
of section 1988(b) in Missouri v. Jenkins.51 In Jenkins, the Supreme Court
addressed both the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment on section
1988(b) and the process that district courts must follow when awarding
fees for paralegal and law clerk time.52 The Jenkins Court first reaffirmed
its holding in Hutto v. Finney,5 3 where it determined that attorney fee
awards ancillary to prospective relief, are "not subject to the strictures of
the Eleventh Amendment."5 4 Building on its reasoning in Hutto, the Jen-
kins Court rejected Missouri's claim that the Eleventh Amendment prohib-
ited a district court from awarding an enhanced fee because of a delayed
payment.5 5 Similarly, the Jenkins Court also rejected Missouri's second
contention that the district court must not calculate the compensation of
paralegals and law clerks by examining the relevant market.56
51. 491 U.S. 274 (1989). This case involved the "attorney's fee aftermath" of
litigation concerning school desegregation. Id. The underlying litigation began in
1977 when the Kansas City Missouri School District, and others, brought suit
against the State of Missouri, alleging that state and federal agencies perpetuated a
system of racial segregation in the metropolitan area of Kansas City. Id. at 276.
After a trial lasting more than half a year, the district court found that the State was
liable and ordered "various intradistrict remedies . . . including $260 million in
capital improvements and a magnet-school plan costing over $200 million." Id.
Soon after prevailing at the trial level, the School District sought to recover attor-
ney's fees persuant to section 1988(b). Id. Subsequently, the district court
awarded approximately $4.0 million in costs and fees. Id. at 276-77.
52. Id. at 275. The State of Missouri argued that sovereign immunity and the
Eleventh Amendment precluded a district court from awarding an enhanced fee
because of a delay in payment. Id. at 249. The State relied on a recent Supreme
Court decision, Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985), in which
the Court held that "[Congress is required to] express its intention to abrogate the
Eleventh Amendment in unmistakable language in the statute itself." Jenkins, 491
U.S. at 279 (quoting Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 243). But the Jenkins Court explained that
the application of section 1988(b) to the states is not contingent on express abro-
gation of the states' immunity. Id. at 284.
The Eleventh Amendment provides: "[tihe Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
The State's second argument in Jenkins, maintained that time allocable to law
clerks and paralegals should be compensated at cost rather than at the market
rate. Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 279.
53. 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
54. Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 279; (citing Hutto, 437 U.S. at 695 (holding that sec-
tion 1988's fee shifting provision is completely consistent with time tested practice
of awarding cost against states)).
55. Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 279. The Jenkins Court concluded that the same prin-
ciples which make the decision of whether to award attorney fees beyond the aus-
pices of the Eleventh Amendment also make the question of how to calculate
reasonable fees beyond the reach of the Eleventh Amendment. Id.
56. Id. at 284-89. The Court rejected the theory that an award based on the
market and not on cost would be in direct derogation of the legislative history
which provides that an award should not be a "windfall" for the attorneys. Id. at
284.
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Finally, two recent Supreme Court cases have attempted to clarify sec-
tion 1988(b)'s application with respect to pro se litigants and the prevail-
ing party concept.5 7 First, the Supreme Court in Kay v. Ehrler,58 held that
a pro se litigant may not invoke section 1988's fee shifting provision.59
The Court reasoned that a pro se litigant, even if a member of the bar,
would be at a disadvantage during the litigation. 60 Accordingly, the Kay
Court concluded that Congress did not intend for section 1988(b) to
award the plaintiff additional compensation; rather, Congress intended
for this provision to attract counsel in order to increase the chances of
success. 61 Second, in Farrar v. Hobby,62 the Court clarified the meaning of
"prevailing party" by explaining that a party "prevails when actual relief on
the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the
parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly bene-
fits the plaintiff."63
The Court explained that "[c]learly, a 'reasonable attorney's fee' cannot have
been meant to compensate only work performed personally by members of the
bar." Id. at 285. Accordingly, if it is the custom of the community to bill paralegals
and law clerks separately, then such an award is necessary under section 1988(b).
Id. at 288. Conversely, if the community incorporates the cost of law clerks and
paralegals into the attorney fee, then that is the process on which the district court
should base an award upon. Id.
For the relevant legislative history of section 1988(b), see supra notes 25, 27.
57. See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992) (involving prevailing parties);
Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432 (1991) (involving pro se litigants).
58. 499 U.S. 432 (1991).
59. Id. at 438. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY defines "pro se" as: "[flor one's own
behalf; in person. Appearing for oneself, as in the case of one who does not retain
a lawyer and appears for himself in court." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1221 (6th ed.
1990).
60. Kay, 499 U.S. at 438. The Supreme Court emphasized that even skilled
lawyers are at a disadvantage if they represents themselves in contested litigation.
Id. Furthermore, the Kay Court looked to the ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY which explained: "[t]he roles of an advocate and of a witness are
inconsistent; the function of an advocate is to advance or argue the cause of an-
other, while that of a witness is to state facts objectively." Id. at 437 n.9 (citing
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-9 (1977)).
61. Id. at 437. The Kay Court followed the wisdom of the time-tested adage
stating that "a lawyer who represents himself has a fool for a client." Id. at 438; see
White v. Armontrout, 29 F.3d 357, 361-62 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying Kay); Bena-
vides v. Bureau of Prisons, 993 F.2d 257, 258-60 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (abandoning
practice of allowing pro se litigants attorney fees in light of Kay); Celeste v. Sulli-
van, 988 F.2d 1069, 1070 (11th Cir. 1992) (explaining Supreme Court's reasoning
in Kay); Chowaniec v. Arlington Park Race Track, Ltd., 934 F.2d 128, 130 (7th Cir.
1991) (following Kay Court's reasoning); see also S.E.C. v. Price Waterhouse, 41
F.3d 805, 808 (2d Cir. 1994) (relying on Kay when denying pro se applicant fees
sought under Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412); Demarest v. Man-
speaker, 948 F.2d 655, 656 (10th Cir. 1991) (same).
62. 506 U.S. 103 (1992).
63. Id. at 111-12 (noting that party must obtain at minimum, some relief on
merits of claim for prevailing party status to attach). In addition, the Court held
that a party who recovers nominal damages is the prevailing party for section
1988(b) purposes. Id. at 573; see A.J. v. Kierst, 56 F.3d 849, 865 (8th Cir. 1995)
(explaining Farrar's holding regarding prevailing parties); Baumgartner v. Harris-
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C. The Quest for "A Reasonable Rate" in the United States Courts of Appeals
The determination of a "reasonable rate" constitutes one half of the
calculation necessary for a district court's computation of a "lodestar."6
4
Generally, a court can easily make this determination as parties tend not
to dispute the applicable rates. 65 As a result, most legal principles regard-
ing awards of attorney fees under section 1988(b) focus on aspects other
than the determination of a reasonable hourly rate.6 6 This Section exam-
ines the different approaches adopted by the circuits in an attempt to de-
termine the applicable reasonable hourly rate.67 In particular, this
burg Housing Auth., 21 F.3d 541, 547 (3d Cir. 1993) (same); American Council of
the Blind v. Romer, 992 F.2d 249, 250 (10th Cir. 1993) (distinguishing Farrar be-
cause "case at bar did not involve a judicial determination on the merits of the
claims asserted in Plaintiffs' lawsuit"); Craig v. Gregg County, 988 F.2d 18, 20 (5th
Cir. 1993) (explaining Farrar's holding regarding prevailing parties); see also Mar-
tin v. Cavalier Hotel Corp., 48 F.3d 1343, 1359 (4th Cir. 1995) (following Farrar
Court's holding); United States v. 27.09 Acres of Land, 43 F.3d 769, 773 (2d Cir.
1994) (applying Farrar); Alexander v. Gerhardt Enter., Inc., 40 F.3d 187, 194 (7th
Cir. 1994) (same); Cameron v. Seitz, 38 F.3d 264, 276 (6th Cir. 1994) (same);
Forrester v. City of San Diego, 25 F.3d 804, 808-09 (9th Cir. 1994) (same), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1104 (1995); Ensley Branch, NAACP v. Seibels, 31 F.3d 1548,
1583 (11th Cir. 1994) (same).
64. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (implicitly adopting
"lodestar" approach). For a discussion of the function and calculation of a "lode-
star," see supra notes 7-9, 41-42 and accompanying text.
65. See John E. Kirklin, The Recovery of Attorney's Fees in Civil Rights Cases Pursu-
ant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1988, in SEcrION 1983 CIvIL RIGHTS LrrIGATION & AT-roR-
NEY'S FEES 1994, 455, 592-93 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook
Series No. H-512, 1994) (noting how courts have "labored ...to determine
whether the hours claimed in the fee application should be reduced"). In Coving-
ton v. District of Columbia however, the parties did just the opposite. Covington v.
District of Columbia, 839 F. Supp. 894, 896 (D.D.C. 1993), affid, 57 F.3d 1101
(D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 916 (1996). While they stipulated the
number of hours reasonably worked, they could not agree on a reasonable hourly
rate. Id.
66. See Kirklin, supra note 65, at 494 (discussing "numerous and complex"
issues involving fee award under section 1988(b)). In particular, Kirklin examines
the need for a party to qualify as a successful plaintiff in order to involve section
1988's fee shifting provision. Id. at 497-99. Kirklin details the extensive rules re-
garding this qualification, including inter alia: "who may be considered a prevailing
party," the need for success on the merits, the appellate method, the concept of
prevailing without judicial relief, and prevailing on interlocutory success. Id. at
497-568.
In addition, much case law has been devoted to the determination of the
amount of hours reasonably worked. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 (stating that dis-
trict courts must exclude hours not reasonably expended); DiFilippo v. Morizio,
759 F.2d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 1985) (emphasizing that party must exercise good "bill-
ing judgment") (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434).
For an extensive review of legal principles involving the determination of a
reasonable number of hours expended, see Kirklin, supra note 65, at 591-622.
67. For a discussion of the circuits' approaches to the determination of "rea-
sonable rates," see infra notes 70-122 and accompanying text.
This Section presents a comprehensive review of the methods employed by
both the Seventh Circuit and District of Columbia Circuit in determining a "rea-
sonable hourly rate." In addition, this Section notes case law from other circuits
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Section focuses on the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit's comprehensive and, for the most part, representative sample of
prevailing "reasonable rate" law. 68 Finally, this Section concludes with an
examination of the District of Columbia Circuit's approach, depicting the
state of the law just prior to the circuit's decision in Covington v. District of
Columbia.69
1. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
In 1992, the Seventh Circuit critically reviewed a district court's reduc-
tion of an applicant's requested hourly rate in Pressley v. Haeger.70 The
Pressley court reaffirmed the position that courts must award prevailing
parties at the market rate for legal services, and not at 'just" or "fair"
rates.7 1 The court reasoned that a fee award under section 1988(b) must
resemble what the market rate actually is, rather than what the judge or
litigants think the market rate is or ought to be.72
indicative of specific intricacies not covered in case law emanating from either of
these two circuits. See, e.g., Standley v. Chilhowee R-IV School Dist., 5 F.3d 319, 325
(8th Cir. 1993) (stating that "computer-based legal research must be factored into
the attorneys' hourly rate, hence the cost of the computer time may not be added
to the fee award").
68. For a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's approach to the determination of
"reasonable rates," see infra notes 70-92 and accompanying text.
69. For a discussion on the District of Columbia Circuit's approach to the
determination of "reasonable rates," see infra notes 93-122 and accompanying text.
70. 977 F.2d 295, 299 (7th Cir. 1992). The case underlying this litigation for
attorney's fees involved racial discrimination against a city's first and only black
police officer. Id. at 296. Officer Pressley faced the endless task of competently
performing his job while the Police Chief conducted administrative policies
against him. Id.; see also ANDREW P. SUTOR, POLICE OPERATIONS: TAcrIicAL AP-
PROACHES To CRIMES IN PROGRESS, at vii (1976) (noting first "street-cop," St.
Michael the Archangel, and his "endless task"). Subsequently, a jury found that
the Wheeling, Illinois, Police Chief discriminated against Mr. Pressley, and as a
result awarded him $40,000 in compensatory damages. Pressley, 977 F.2d at 296.
71. Pressey, 977 F.2d at 299. The court explained that "[i]t is not the function
of judges in fee litigation to determine the equivalent of the medieval just price,"
but it is the judge's function "to determine what the lawyer would receive if he
were selling his services in the market rather than being paid by court order." Id.
(quoting Continental Illinois Sec. Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 568 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting
that judge was mistaken in thinking that he knew value of attorney's services better
that market did)); see also Kurowski v. Krajewski, 848 F.2d 767, 776-77 (7th Cir.
1988) (same); Kirchoffv. Flynn, 786 F.2d 320, 330-31 (7th Cir. 1986) (Eschbach,J.,
dissenting) (same); Bohen v. City of East Chicago, 666 F. Supp. 154, 156-57 (N.D.
Ind. 1987) (same).
72. PressLey, 977 F.2d at 299. Many Circuits have recently expounded this
same view. SeeJane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1505, 1510 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding
that "hourly rates must" comport with applicable market rate); Gates v. Rowland,
39 F.3d 1439, 1449 (9th Cir. 1994) (recognizing that "relevant legal community for
determining the prevailing market rates for attorneys' fees is the community in
which the forum is situated"); Wayne v. Village of Sebring, 36 F.3d 517, 533 (6th
Cir. 1994) (explaining that district court can apply either local market rates or
market rates of attorneys' home practice), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2000 (1995); Lo-
ranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 781 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating that prevailing mar-
16
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Following Pressley, the Seventh Circuit in Barrow v. Falck ("Barrow i,) 7
reversed the district court's award under section 1988(b) because of a lack
of evidence. 74 According to the Barrow Icourt, the district court erred in
awarding attorney fees at an hourly rate of $135, instead of the lower rate
supported by the evidence. 75 The Barrow I court explained that while
other lawyers in this market may have rates in the range of $135, the rec-
ord established that this particular attorney had a market rate of $110 or
less.76 In addition, the Seventh Circuit again reaffirmed that ajudge must
not seek to determine a "fair" or 'just" rate, but must award the applicable
ket rate must be applied in section 1988(b) fee ward)'; McNabola v. Chicago
Transit Auth., 10 F.3d 501, 519 (7th Cir. 1993) (explaining that "lodestar must be
based on the market rate for the attorney's work" (emphasis added)); Plyler v.
Evatt, 902 F.2d 273, 277 (4th Cir. 1990) (noting that "market rate [s] should guide
the fee inquiry"); Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990) (stat-
ing that reasonable hourly rate must be "calculated according to prevailing market
rates"); Jordan v. Multnomah County, 815 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating
that "prevailing market rate in the community is indicative of a reasonable hourly
rate").
73. 977 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Barrow I").
74. Id. at 1105. The case underlying this litigation for attorney fees began
when a sheriff suspended a deputy sheriff without a prior hearing. Id. at 1101. At
the trial, the districtjudge found that this omission was in violation of the Constitu-
tion's Due Process Clause. Id. Subsequently, a jury awarded $3,700 in damages
and the deputy sought an award of fees under section 1988(b). Id. at 1101-02.
Within one year after the Seventh Circuit remanded this case, the parties
brought another appeal to the circuit. Barrow v. Falck, 11 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 1993)
("Barrow II"). For a discussion of Barrow I, see infra notes 88-92 and accompany-
ing text.
75. Barrow I, 977 F.2d at 1105. The Seventh Circuit noted that the district
court relied on one affidavit from a member of the local bar that stated in a con-
clusory manner that the "market rate for attorneys possessing the 'experience,
qualifications, reputation and ability' of plaintiff's lawyer is $135 per hour in civil
rights cases." Id. at 1104-05. Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit revealed that the
applicant never even once received over $120 per hour. Id. at 1105.
Although the court did not expressly state that the burden of proof is on the
fee applicant, this case evidences the solid foundation of that rule. Id. Many cir-
cuits have recently reaffirmed this rule. See, e.g., Nydam v. Lennerton, 948 F.2d
808, 811 (1st Cir. 1991) (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 n.11 (1984)
(stating that "burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence"));
Plyler, 902 F.2d at 277 (explaining that "the burden rests with the fee applicant to
establish the reasonableness of a requested rate"); Smith v. Freeman, 921 F.2d
1120, 1122 (10th Cir. 1990) (same); Powell v. C.I.R., 891 F.2d 1167, 1173 (5th Cir.
1990) (same); Chambless v. Masters, Mates & Pilots Pension Plan, 885 F.2d 1053,
1059 (2d Cir. 1989) (same); Southerland v. International Longshoremen's and
Warehousemen's Union Local 8, 834 F.2d 790, 795 (9th Cir. 1987), superseded, 845
F.2d 796 (1987) (same) (citing Jordan, 815 F.2d at 1261-63).
76. Barrow I, 977 F.2d at 1105. The court reasoned that "rates vary with skill
and the time a lawyer needs to accomplish a task." Id. The Barrow I court noted
that the most the fee applicant has ever received for his services from a paying
client was between $80 and $110. Id. As a result, the Barrow I court refused to
award attorney's fees at an hourly rate which is higher than Mr. Barrow could
command in the market. Id. at 1105-06.
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market rate. 77 Judge Easterbrook, writing for the majority, explained that
"[j]udges must stick to the market rate for the attorneys' time-that is to
say, the opportunity costs of their time, the rate they could receive in other
engagements.
78
The Barrow Icourt also analogized awarding prevailing parties in civil
rights litigation at premium rates to the use of risk multipliers because
both act as a bonus for winning. 79 The Barrow I court explained that be-
cause the Supreme Court in City of Burlington v. Dague0° rejected the use of
risk multipliers, the use of premium rates must also be rejected.8 1 Fur-
thermore, while the court in Barrow Inoted the possibility that the appli-
cant attorney may have charged reduced rates for non-economic reasons,
it recognized that under the Supreme Court's decision in Blum v. Stenson,
77. Id. at 1105. The Barrow Icourt found that there was no need to examine a
hypothetical because the record indicated what the market would pay this attor-
ney. Id. (quoting Continental Illinois Securities Litigation, 962 F.2d at 568 (noting
that judge's function is to determine what attorney could receive in relevant
market)).
78. Id. The Barrow I court, however, qualified its holding by explaining that
"[u] nless there is evidence that attorneys receive more per hour, from their own
clients, in civil rights litigation than in other kinds of litigation ... the court must
use the hourly rate for the attorney's regular legal services." Id.
Opportunity costs are "the cost of a good or service as measured by the alter-
native uses that are forgone by producing the good or service." WALTER NIcHo-
SON, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 16-17 (1990) (noting that every economic
action involves opportunity cost).
79. Barrow 1, 977 F.2d at 1105. The court concluded that if only premium
rates are awarded by court, the market is not truly reflected in the award. Id. As a
result, the premium rates compensate not only for time spent on the litigation
underlying the successful fee application, but also compensation for the cases
which fail on the merits. Id. Accordingly, the court called this effect a "disguised
multiplier." Id.
80. 505 U.S. 557 (1992).
81. Barrow I, 977 F.2d at 1105; Burlington, 505 U.S. at 565-66. The Burlington
Court refused to allow a district court to enhance an attorney fee award because of
added risk. Burlington, 505 U.S. at 565-66; see Davis v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 6 F.3d
367, 381 (6th Cir. 1993) ("disavow[ing]" previous holding contrary to Burlington),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1298 (1994); Cann v. Carpenters' Pension Trust Fund For
Northern California, 989 F.2d 313, 317-18 (9th Cir. 1993) (harmonizing Burlington
with past Ninth Circuit opinions rejecting risk enhancements); Shipes v. Trinity
Indus., 987 F.2d 311, 322-23 (5th Cir. 1993) ("[a]ccepting the error of previous
thinking, and following the clearly lighted path of Burlington" and rejecting risk
multiplier enhancement); Gilleo v. City of Ladue, 986 F.2d 1180, 1184 (8th Cir.
1993) (applying Burlington and rejecting fee enhancement based on risk), aff'd,
114 S. Ct. 2038 (1994); Lipsett v. Blanco, 975 F.2d 934, 943 (1st Cir. 1992) (aban-
doning practice of awarding contingency enhancements in light of Supreme
Court's opinion in Burlington); Broyles v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensa-
tion Programs, 974 F.2d 508, 510 (4th Cir. 1992) (applying Burlington's no risk
enhancement holding).
The Burlington Court reasoned that "[clontingency enhancements would
make the setting of fees more complex and arbitrary, hence more unpredictable,
and hence more litigable." Burlington, 505 U.S. at 566; see Hensley v. Eckerhart,
461 U.S. 424 (1983) (stating that "request for attorney's fees should not result in a
second major litigation").
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lawyers who donate their time and services at bargain rates may collect the
full market value in a section 1988(b) award. 82 The Barrow I court, how-
ever, refused to award attorney fees at a rate that the applicant attorney
had never before received from a paying client.8 3 In doing so, and with-
out articulating a rationale of its own, the Barrow I court questioned the
economic theoretical soundness of awarding attorney fees above the rate
at which the attorneys actually charge their clients. 84
Just over one year after Barrow I, the Seventh Circuit once again de-
cided two cases involving the determination of a "reasonable rate."85 First,
the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its position that a district court must deter-
mine an hourly rate based on the market rate for the attorney's services in
82. Barrow I, 977 F.2d at 1105. The court in Barrow I, noted the possibility that
the applicant attorney may have charged reduced rates. Id. The court further
recognized that under the Supreme Court's decision in Blum, attorneys who
charge reduced rates for non-economic reasons are entitled to rates "they could
obtain if the charitable element were removed." Id. To support this, the Barrow I
court cited a District of Columbia Circuit case which followed Blum. See Barrow I,
977 F.2d at 1105 (citing SOCM, 857 F.2d 1516 (D.C. Cir 1988) (en banc) (stating
that attorneys who charge reduced hourly rates may collect market rates for their
time)). For a discussion of SOCM see infra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
83. Barrow 1, 977 F.2d at 1105-06. The Barrow I court explained that regard-
less of whether the applicant attorney charged a reduced rate, he had never
charged a paying client more than $120 per hour. Id. at 1106. Accordingly, the
court found that the market rate could not be $135, the rate at which the trial
court awarded fees. Id.; see also, Davis v. City and County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d
1536, 1545 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that district court must award attorney fees at
rates "established by reference to the fees that private attorneys of an ability and
reputation comparable to that of prevailing counsel charge their paying clients for
legal work of similar complexity"), vacated in part by, 984 F.2d 345 (1993).
84. Barrow 1, 977 F.2d at 1106. In dicta, the Barrow Icourt examined the eco-
nomics of awarding attorney fees. Id. The Barrow I court explained that:
One might reply that if ideology leads some lawyers to favor a particular
clientele, and so reduces what these persons must pay for legal services,
this is the market at work. The lawyers get consumption value out of
working for certain clients and so charge less, just as lawyers who flock to
Arizona for the desert air and scenery receive less per hour than those
who must suffer a wind chill of -50 degrees along the lakefront of the
Windy City. No one would dream of saying that the market rate of a
lawyer in Phoenix who bills $200 per hour "really" is $300 per hour, be-
cause he could get this by braving the winters (and enduring the grind)
of a corporate practice in Chicago. When defendants pay corporate rates
to union lawyers, counsel receive a rare treat: psychic income they can
spend. Save Our Cumberland Mountains drew a vigorous dissent along
these lines from judges who would have followed rather than overruled
Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 746 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
Id. Although failing to actually use economic terms, this analytical approach ap-
pears to examine the utility an attorney receives from working for a client who has
suffered a civil rights invasion. See NICHOLSON, supra note 78, at 62 (explaining
concept of utility and indifference curves).
85. For a discussion of McNabola v. Chicago Transit Auth., 10 F.3d 501 (7th
Cir. 1993), see infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Barrow
II, 11 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 1994), see infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
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McNabola v. Chicago Transit Authority.86 The McNabola court explained that
this rate is "the rate that lawyers of similar ability and experience in the
community normally charge their paying clients for the type of work in
question."87
Second, the Seventh Circuit again heard an appeal concerning Barrow
v. Falck ("Barrow Ifi).88 On remand succeeding Barrow I, the district court
failed to follow the Barrow Icourt's instructions. 89 As a result, in Barrow II
the Seventh Circuit vacated the awarded rate of $135 and set the rate for
the fees at $95 per hour.90 The Barrow II court reasoned that while the
applicant produced "a flurry of affidavits about what other lawyers charge
for their work," he offered no evidence concerning what he actually
charged for his work. 9 ' As a result, the Barrow II court set the hourly rate
at $95 per hour-the "midpoint" between two rates which the record es-
tablished that the applicant had actually charged.92
86. McNabola, 10 F.3d at 518; see Eddleman v. Switchcraft, Inc., 965 F.2d 422,
424 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that district courts must apply market rate); Leffer v.
Meer, 936 F.2d 981, 984 (7th Cir. 1991) (same).
In addition, the McNabola court also reaffirmed that the fee applicant has the
"burden of substantiating the reasonableness of the hours expended and the
hourly rate." McNabola, 10 F.3d at 518. See also Estate of Borst v. O'Brien, 979 F.2d
511, 515 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that burden is on fee applicant).
87. McNabola, 10 F.3d at 518 (citing Eddleman, 965 F.2d at 424 (quoting Henry
v. Wedermeier, 738 F.2d 188, 193 (7th Cir. 1984))).
88. 11 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Barrow II"). For a discussion of Barrow I, see
supra notes 73-84 and accompanying text.
89. Barrow II, 11 F.3d at 730. The Seventh Circuit criticized the district court's
disposition of Barrow Ion remand. Id. The district court had again awarded $135
after the Seventh Circuit had vacated that same award in Barrow L Id.
Unless parties can convince a district judge that Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 60(b) justifies modification of the decision, "the district judge must take the
appellate decision as conclusive." Id. at 731; see Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
429 U.S. 17, 18 (1976) (emphasizing appellate decision is conclusive); United
States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 325 (1961) (same); Insur-
ance Group Comm. v. Denver & Rio Grande R.L, 329 U.S. 607, 612 (1947)
(same); FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 140-41 (1940) (same);
Milwaukee R.R. v. Soutter, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 510, 512 (1864) (same); West v.
Brashear, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 51, 53 (1840) (same); Sibbald v. United States, 37 U.S.
(12 Pet.) 488 (1838) (same); Cole Energy Development Co. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.,
8 F.3d 607, 609-10 (7th Cir. 1993) (same).
90. See Barrow II, 11 F.3d at 730 (stating that "[s]uch flouting of our instruc-
tions leads us to vacate the district court's judgment and set the fees ourselves"); cf
In re Continental Illinois Sec. Litig., 985 F.2d 867, 867-69 (7th Cir. 1993) (failure to
execute appellate instructions regarding determination of attorney fees leads to
writ of mandamus).
91. Barrow II, 11 F.3d at 732; see McNabola, 10 F.3d at 518 (reaffirming that fee
applicant has "burden of substantiating the reasonableness of the hours expended
and the hourly rate"); Borst, 979 F.2d at 515 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that burden is
on fee applicant).
92. Barrow II, 11 F.3d at 732. The court reasoned that section 1988(b) "for-
bids the use of an especially high hourly rate in civil rights cases." Id. at 731 (citing
City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 563 (1992)). Accordingly, the court
found that no ustification existed for the court to award the fee applicant fees at a
rate above which he or she had ever previously charged. Id. at 732.
[Vol. 41: p. 825
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2. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
The District of Columbia Circuit first addressed the determination of
a reasonable rate under a statute similar to section 1988(b) in Copeland v.
Marshall.93 While sitting en banc, the D.C. Circuit held that a district
court must not calculate an award of attorney fees differently when the
government is the losing party.94 Further, the D.C. Circuit stated that "the
reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar
work."95 In addition, the D.C. Circuit in Copeland explained that an award
of market fees to salaried public interest attorneys is consistent with Con-
gress's intent.96 Finally, the D.C. Circuit also noted that a reasonable
93. 641 F.2d 880, 892 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc). The litigation underlying
this attorney fees dispute involved a successful gender-discrimination class suit
against the United States Department of Labor. Id. Upon a petition for attorney
fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, the district court awarded counsel $160,000. Id. at
883. A panel of the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district court's award
and remanded the case. Id. at 883-84. The Circuit, however, sitting en banc, ulti-
mately rejected the panel's decision and affirmed the district court's award. Id. at
884.
94. Id. at 894. The court reasoned that the amount of an attorney's fee award
should not turn on the identity of the losing party. Id. The court looked to Con-
gress's intent and concluded that the "primary purpose [of this fee shifting statute]
is to help persons obtain competent counsel with which to vindicate civil rights
through litigation." Id. at 895 (citing Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., Inc., 390 U.S.
400, 402 (1968)). The court explained that:
Unlike private sector employees, federal employee complainants are not
merely private attorneys general; they are the only attorneys general
under the enforcement scheme adopted in Section 717, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-16 (Supp. V 1975). Suits in behalf of federal employees by the
Attorney General or EEOC are not authorized against federal agencies.
Indeed, the Attorney General is frequently counsel for the other side.
Also unlike private sector employees, federal employees must first bring
their employment discrimination grievances, not to an independent state
or local administrative body or to EEOC, but to the very agency about
whose practices they are complaining.
Id. (citing Parker v. Califano, 561 F.2d 320, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1977)); see Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 n.7 (1983) (noting that standards pertaining to stat-
utes which contain fee shifting provision to prevailing party are generally
applicable).
95. Copeland, 641 F.2d at 892 (citing Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express,
Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 718 (5th Cir. 1974)); see Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11
(1984) (noting that "requested rates [must be] in line with those prevailing in the
community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experi-
ence, and reputation").
96. Copeland, 641 F.2d at 899. The Copeland court noted that the legislative
history cites with approval a California case, Davis v. County of L.A., 8 Empl. Prac.
Dec. 5047 (C.D. Cal. 1974). Copeland, 641 F.2d at 899. The Davis court held that:
It is not legally relevant that plaintiffs' counsel . .. are employed by the
Center for Law In The Public Interest, a privately funded non-profit pub-
lic interest law firm. It is in the interest of the public that such law firms
be awarded reasonable attorneys' fees to be computed in the traditional
manner ....
Id. at 899 (quoting Davis, 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. at 5048-49).
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hourly rate is the "product of a multiplicity of factors," and as a result,
must account for skill, time limitations, reputation and undesirability.9 7
Less than two years after Copeland, the District of Columbia Circuit
clarified its holding, in National Association of Concerned Veterans v. Secretary
of Defense ("NACV').98 The NACVcourt began by reaffirming that the "key
issue" in determining a "lodestar" is the calculation of the applicable rea-
sonable hourly rate.99 The court noted, however, that the Copeland deci-
sion failed to offer guidance concerning how trial courts should
determine the reasonable rate.10 0
Accordingly, and having acknowledged this void, the NACVcourt out-
lined the necessary requirements for both the fee applicant and the op-
posing party.10 ' First, the NACV court explained that an applicant is
"required to provide specific evidence of the prevailing community rates
for the type of work for which he seeks an award. 10 2 The NACVcourt did
97. Copeland, 641 F.2d at 892.
98. 675 F.2d 1319, 1324-27 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("NACV"). The NACVcourt con-
solidated three cases involving awards of attorney fees. See Parker v. Secretary of
Transp., 670 F.2d 249, 250 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (involving Title VII action, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(k) (1976)); Green v. Department of Commerce, 489 F. Supp. 977, 978(D.C. 1980) (involving Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976)); Na-
tional Ass'n of Concerned Veterans v. Secretary of Defense, 487 F. Supp. 192, 194(D.C. 1979) (involving Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552).
99. NACV, 675 F.2d at 1324 (citing Copeland, 641 F.2d at 892). The NACV
court further acknowledged that the hourly rate depends on the experience of the
attorney, and the particular work involved. Id. at 1325. The NACVcourt further
explained that determining a reasonable rate is more difficult that it appears. Id.
The NACVcourt noted that an attorney's hourly rate will vary with factors such as:
(1) skill necessary; (2) time limitations; (3) amount sought in the litigation; (4)
reputation of attorney; (5) desirability or undesirability of the case; (6) personal
professional interests; (7) ability of clients to pay. Id.
100. See id. (stating that "no guidance was provided as to the nature of the
submission an applicant for a statutory fee award should make in the District Court
to support the hourly rate requested"); cf. Wojtkowski v. Cade, 725 F.2d 127, 131
(1st Cir. 1984) (explaining that while fee applicants are not required to document
prevailing community rates, they may if they choose).
101. NAC, 675 F.2d at 1325-26. An additional requirement which the NACV
court did not discuss is qualifying as the prevailing party. See Kirklin, supra note 65,
at 497-99 (examining issues courts must consider when determining whether party.
has reached prevailing party status). In addition, the NACV court noted that
"[a] ttorneys who anticipate making a fee application must maintain contempora-
neous, complete and standardized time records." NACV, 675 F.2d at 1327; see Ra-
mos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 553 (10th Cir. 1983) (requiring fee applicants to
maintain "meticulous, contemporaneous time records"); New York Ass'n of Re-
tarded Children v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1147-48 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating that "for
the future, that contemporaneous time records are a prerequisite for attorney's
fees in this Circuit").
102. NAC, 675 F.2d at 1325. The court gave examples of the type of specific
evidence a fee applicant must produce. Id. These examples include: (1) affidavits
detailing the precise fees that fee paying clients pay similarly qualified attorneys;
and (2) recent fees district courts have awarded to attorneys of comparable reputa-
tion and experience. Id.; see Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1402 (4th Cir. 1987)(explaining that fee applicant may establish prevailing market "through affidavits
reciting the precise fees that counsel with similar qualifications have received in
22
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qualify this requirement, however, by explaining that "generalized" and
"conclusory" evidence, including affidavits from "friendly attorneys," is in-
sufficient to meet the burden of production.' 03 Furthermore, the NACV
court noted that the best evidence a district court can consider is the ac-
tual billing rate the applicant or the applicant's firm customarily charges
their clients. 10 4 Arising at this conclusion, the NACVcourt reasoned that
this evidence offers "substantiating evidence" and is highly relevant in
proving the prevailing community rate. 10 5 The second requirement out-
lined by the NACVcourt was that once a fee applicant has sufficiently sup-
ported the requested rate, the burden shifts to the other party to offer
equally "specific countervailing evidence" as to why the proposed rate is
erroneous.
10 6
Six years after the NACV court clarified Copeland, an en banc District
of Columbia Circuit revisited its determination of a reasonable hourly rate
in Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel ("SOCM').107 In SOCM,
comparable cases; information concerning recent fee awards by courts in compara-
ble cases; and specific evidence of counsel's actual billing practice or other evi-
dence of the actual rates which counsel can command in the market").
103. NACV, 675 F.2d at 1325. The NACVcourt explained that "[t]o be useful,
an affidavit stating an attorney's opinion as to the market rate should be as specific
as possible." Id. (emphasis added). The NACV court then defined this specificity
requirement. Id. The NACV court noted that for an affidavit to be considered
specific, it should include: (1) whether the rate is for present work, or past work;
(2) whether the rate is a general rate or for a specific type of litigation; and (3)
whether the rate is an average rate or a rate charged specifically for an attorney
with a certain amount of experience. Id.
104. Id. The NACVcourt held that in some cases the district court may re-
quire the applicant to produce his or her actual billing practice during the rele-
vant time period. Id. at 1326. The NACV court, however, did note that if the
applicant is a public interest attorney "who does not do any work for fees," the appli-
cant need not submit this type of evidence. Id. at 1326 n.7a (citing Copeland, 641
F.2d at 898) (emphasis added).
105. Id. at 1326. "Accordingly, the actual rate that applicant's counsel can
command in the market is itself highly relevant proof of the prevailing community
rate." Id. The NACVcourt further explained that this evidence may be essential to
a district court when determining the award. Id. The NACVcourt noted that the
district court may require the fee applicant to even produce the billing schedule
for cases worked on during the period of the litigation at hand. Id. The NACV
court explained that this evidence will ensure that the amount of the fee award is
not just what the attorney would like to receive, but what on average that attorney
has received. Id.
106. Id. Once the applicant has satisfied his or her initial burden, the pendu-
lum swings back to the other party to present evidence which rebuts the requested
rate and proves why the rate is not the market rate. Id. The NACVcourt noted,
however, that if the fee applicant has presented evidence which is so weak, the
other party may without more simply challenge the rate as unsubstantiated. Id.
107. 857 F.2d 1516, 1518-20 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("SOCM") (en banc). Following
a suit based on the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C.
§ 1270(d), the district court awarded the prevailing party attorney fees. SOCM, 857
F.2d at 1517, 1519 n.1. While the Circuit in SOCM noted that the panel of the
District of Columbia Circuit applied the correct three-part analysis of attorney fees,
it concluded that the panel applied the second prong incorrectly. See id. at 1517
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the D.C. Circuit had to determine whether to overrule a case decided four
years earlier, Laffey v. Northwest Airlines.108 In Laffey, the court held that
district courts should calculate the reasonable hourly rate for an attorney
who customarily charges below market rates in order to serve the public,
according to the rate charged in similar cases by that attorney's firm.1 09
The D.C. Circuit in SOCM, declined to subscribe to the Laffey formulation,
finding it wholly inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent and Con-
gress's intent.' 10 The D.C. Circuit in SOCM emphasized its rationale by
depicting numerous hypothetical situations in which the Laffey approach
would lead to an anomalous result. 1 I In its conclusion, however, the D.C.
Circuit in SOCM did offer a degree of support to the matrix of reasonable
rates developed in Laffey (the Laffey Matrix), which classify hourly rates
based on the number of years since the attorney graduated law school. 112
(noting that "the District Court applied the correct three-part analysis to deter-
mine the appropriate award: (1) determination of the number of hours reasonably
expended in litigation; (2) determination of a reasonable hourly rate or 'lodestar';
and (3) the use of multipliers as merited").
108. 746 F. Supp. 374 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (involving award of $5 million in attor-
neys fees arising out of litigation continuing for more than one decade); see SOCM,
857 F.2d at 1517 (revisiting Laffey).
109. See Laffey, 746 F. Supp. at 374 (rejecting argument that "because Plain-
tiffis counsel is 'union-oriented labor law firm,' its rates for litigating this action
should be determined by the market for legal services 'in the recognized "labor
law" specialty"') (citations omitted).
110. See SOCM, 857 F.2d at 1521 (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895-96
(1984)). The SOCM court noted that Congress intended not only to attract coun-
sel, but competent counsel. Id. Accordingly, the SOCM court concluded that "[it
is not inconsistent with the avoidance of windfalls to pay attorneys at rates com-
mensurate with prevailing community standards of attorneys of like expertise do-
ing the same sort of work in the same area." Id.; see S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 6(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5913 (rejecting "windfalls" for attor-
neys); see also Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478
U.S. 546, 565 (1986) (emphasizing that Congress did not intend for section
1988(b) to improve financial lot of attorneys, acting as form of economic relief).
111. SOCM, 857 F.2d at 1520. The SOCM court first explained that under
section 1988(b), highly paid private practice attorneys receive their "usual hand-
some rates." Id. Next, the SOCM court noted that a legal aid attorney, will also
receive the higher rates as per the Supreme Court's decision in Blum. Id. The
anomaly occurs when an attorney's practice cannot be neatly categorized into
either group. Id. In particular, the attorneys who charge lower rates to some cli-
ents for non-economic reasons will "receive fee awards often significantly smaller
than those calculated" in the other two categories. Id.
112. See id. at 1525 (commending fee schedule established in Laffey). The
court explained that "[w]e do not intend . . . to diminish the value of the fee
schedule compiled in ... Laffey .... Indeed, we commend its use for the year to
which it applies." Id. This fee schedule, the Laffey Matrix, proposes the following
fee rates:
- $175 an hour for very experienced federal court litigators, i.e., lawyers
in their 20th year or more after graduation from law school;
. $150 an hour for experienced federal court litigators in their 11th
through 19th years after law school graduation;$125 an hour for experienced federal court litigators in their 8th
through 10th years after graduation from law school;
[Vol. 41: p. 825
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In the year following the District of Columbia Circuit's decision in
SOCM, the Circuit decided two additional cases impacting the interpreta-
tion of the "reasonable hourly rate." 113 In the first instance, the court
held in In re Donovan1 14 that because the fee applicants requested their
usual hourly rates, these rates were reasonable.'1 5 In the second case, the
court in In re Olson1 16 rejected the use of premium rates instead of an
attorney's usual billing rate. 1 17 While concluding that the district court
must apply the lower rates, the court in Olson focused on the fee appli-
cant's two alleged reasons for seeking the higher rates.1 18 First, the Olson
court rejected the higher rates, noting that they appeared "to be a contin-
gency fee argument."'1 9 Second, the Olson court discarded the higher
rates based on the Supreme Court's holding that a delay in payment does
not justify fee enhancement against the United States.1 20
- $100 an hour for senior associates, i.e., 4 to 7 years after graduation
from law school;
- $75 an hour for junior associates, i.e., 1 to 3 years after law school
graduation;
Laffey, 572 F. Supp. at 371.
113. InreOlson, 884 F.2d 1415 (D.C. Cir. 1989); In reDonovan, 877 F.2d 982
(D.C. Cir. 1989). During this same year, a district court in the District of Columbia
Circuit also addressed the reasonable rates under section 1988(b). See Thompson
v. Kennickell, 710 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1989) (ruling that because government
"offered no 'specific contrary evidence,"' plaintiff is entitled to award at requested
rates); see also NACV, 675 F.2d 1319, 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (stating that "in the
normal case the Government must either accede to the applicant's requested rate
or provide specific contrary evidence tending to show that a lower rate would be
appropriate").
114. 877 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
115. Id. at 993. The fee applicants also submitted supporting affidavits from
independent qualified counsel, which asserted that these requested rates were
within the range of rates charged by similar attorneys. Id.
116. 884 F.2d 1415 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
117. Id. at 1424 (finding "fault with . .. [fee applicant counsel's] practice of
billing Olson at its premium 'C' rate as opposed to its normal 'A' rate').
118. Id. The applicant first contended that they charged Olson the higher
rates because "he was unable to meet his financial obligations to the firm on a basis
consistent with the firm's normal requirements." Id. And second, because the "C"
rate was an offset for the "necessarily ... significant delay." Id.
119. Id. The Olson court explained that the Supreme Court had just held
"that a risk of nonpayment is not present where an attorney preserves a right of
recourse against a client for unpaid fees." Id.; see Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley
Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 716 (1987) (stating that "when the
plaintiff has agreed to pay its attorney, win or lose, the attorney has not assumed
the risk of nonpayment and there is no occasion to adjust the lodestar fee because
the case was a risky one"); see alsoJones v. Central Soya Co., 748 F.2d 586, 593 (11th
Cir. 1984) (holding that "[a] lawyer may not preserve a right of recourse against
his client for fees and still expect to be compensated as if he had sacrificed com-
pletely his right to payment in the event of an unsuccessful outcome").
120. Olson, 884 F.2d at 1425 (citing Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310,
316 (1986)). The Olson court analogized an enhancement because of a delay in
payment of interest. Id. Then, the Olson court explained that recovering prejudg-
ment interest against the United States is prohibited absent express congressional
waiver. Id.; see Angarica v. Bayard, 127 U.S. 251, 260-61 (1888) (holding that it is
25
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During the early 1990s, the District of Columbia Circuit addressed
relatively few cases concerning reasonable rate determination under sec-
tion 1988(b). 12 1 This decade was not to pass, however, without the D.C.
Circuit again revisiting this issue. On June 23, 1995, the court did just
that, and again revisited the determination of reasonable rates for legal
services in Covington v. District of Columbia.122
III. FACTS: COVINGTON V DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
In Covington v. District of Columbia, the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia consolidated three district court cases, Coving-
ton v. District of Columbia,123 Sexcius v. District of Columbia124 and Galloway v.
Superior Court,12 5 all of which challenged the shifting of fees under section
1988(b). 126 In the district court's Covington decision, ten inmates from a
"well-settled principle that the United States are not liable to pay interest on claims
against them, in the absence of express statutory provisions to that effect"); Tillson
v. United States, 100 U.S. 43, 47 (1879) (stating that "interest, however, would have
been recoverable . . .if the payments were unreasonably delayed. But with the
government the rule is different ... the practice which has long prevailed in the
departments of not allowing interest on claims presented, except in some way spe-
cifically provided for").
121. But see Goos v. National Ass'n of Realtors, 997 F.2d 1565, 1569 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (holding that without evidence that fee applicant charged reduced rate, dis-
trict court properly applied usual billing rate); Kattan v. District of Columbia, 995
F.2d 274, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (stating that "district court's discretion as to the
proper hourly rate to award counsel should not be upset absent clear misapplica-
tion of legal principles, arbitrary fact finding, or unprincipled disregard for record
evidence") (citing King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc)).
122. See Covington v. District of Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1107-10 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (examining reasonable rate case law). For a discussion of the facts of Coving-
ton, see infta notes 123-38 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Coving-
ton court's analysis, see infra notes 142-77 and accompanying text. For a critical
examination of the Covington court's analysis, see infra notes 178-201 and accompa-
nying text. For the probable impact Covington will have on future litigation of
attorney fee awards, see infra notes 202-17 and accompanying text.
123. 839 F. Supp. 894 (D.D.C. 1993).
124. 839 F. Supp. 919 (D.D.C. 1993).
125. No. CIVA.91-0644, 1994 WI. 162410 (D.D.C. Apr. 21, 1994).
126. Covington, 57 F.3d at 1103. Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure allows for the consolidation of cases involving, inter alia, a common ques-
tion of law. FED. R. Crv. P. 42(a). Rule 42(a) provides the district court with broad
discretion when deciding whether to consolidate. Investors Research Co. v. United
States Dist. Court, 877 F.2d 777, 777 (1989).
The Covington court, however, only reviewed the evidence presented to the
district court in Covington. Covington, 57 F.3d at 1103. The litigation underlying
the two other attorney fees petitions which the District of Columbia Circuit subse-
quently condensed into Covington involved two very different causes of action.
First, Sexcius involved an action alleging a violation of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. Sexcius, 839 F. Supp. at 920. In Sexcius, two teachers in the District
of Columbia spoke out against certain educational practices. Id. At trial, the
teachers won a permanent injunction against, inter alia, the District of Columbia,
prohibiting them from retaliating against the teachers in their workplace. Id. at
921. The district court, in ruling upon the teachers' motion for attorney fees,
850
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District of Columbia correctional facility alleged that the District of Co-
lumbia ("District") deprived them of their civil rights when several correc-
tional officers severely beat them while they were handcuffed and
shackled.' 2 7 After a jury found for the inmates on all of the tried issues,
the District moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 128 The
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, however, summa-
rily denied the District's motion. 129 Subsequently, the District decided
not to pursue an appeal, but agreed to settle and pay each of the inmates
$25,000.00.130
After the parties settled the underlying litigation, the inmates' attor-
neys sought to invoke section 1988's fee shifting provision. 3 1 Both parties
agreed that the District owed attorney fees. 132 The parties, however, could
not come to an agreement on the applicable reasonable rates. 133
While ruling upon the inmates' motion for attorney fees, the district
court in Covington held that the plaintiffs' counsel, acting in the "public
interest but [as] private practice lawyers .... [were] entitled to receive
prevailing market rates for their services." 13 4 The Covington district court
applied the Laffey Matrix, and awarded them $247,809.87 in fees and costs. Id. at
920 (applying matrix developed in Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 572 F. Supp.
354 (D.D.C. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 746 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). The District
of Columbia Circuit subsequently consolidated this appeal with the appeals from
Covington and Galloway. Covington, 57 F.3d at 1103.
Next, the litigation underlying the claim for attorney fees in Galloway centered
around a handicap discrimination suit. Id. In Galloway, the district court, also ap-
plied the Laffey Matrix and awarded $81,105.20 in costs and fees. Galloway, 1994
WL 162410, at *2. For a detailed discussion of the Laffey Matrix, see supra note
112.
127. Covington, 839 F. Supp. at 895. In addition to beating the prisoners while
they were shackled, the prisoners also alleged that they were "sent to a maximum
security facility without proper hearings." Covington, 57 F.3d at 1103-04.
128. Covington, 839 F. Supp. at 895. Under Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, a party may renew a motion for judgment after the trial. FED. R.
Cirv. P. 50(b). In the event a party motions under Rule 50(b), the trial court, at its
discretion, may direct entry ofjudgment as a matter of law. Id. This entry is com-
monly referred to as 'judgment notwithstanding the verdict." STEPHEN C. YEAZELL
ET AL., CML PROCEDURE 41 (1992).
129. See Covington, 839 F. Supp. at 895 (noting that initially, District sought to
appeal verdict).
130. Id. In addition to agreeing to pay each of the inmates monetary com-
pensation, the District agreed to concede that the plaintiffs were prevailing parties
for 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) purposes. Id.
131. Covington, 57 F.3d at 1102-03. For the relevant text of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988(b), see supra note 4.
132. Covington, 839 F. Supp. at 895-96.
133. Id. at 896. Although a "lodestar" calculation requires establishing both a
reasonable hourly rate and a reasonable number of hours spent, the Covington
district court only examined the former. Id. Because the parties stipulated as to
the number of hours reasonably worked, the Covington district court's analysis
solely examined the reasonable hourly rate prong. Id.
134. Id. at 897. In order to determine "prevailing market rates," the district
court first examined the scope of the "relevant market." Id. The Covington district
27
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explained that a "survey" of attorneys' rates within the relevant market is
the "ideal" process through which a court may determine the applicable
rates.135 While the fee applicants in Covington did not produce such a
survey, however, the district court found their fee matrix sufficient. 136 Ac-
court rejected the District of Columbia's argument that the "relevant market
should be narrowly defined as that market of lawyers who represent plaintiffs in
civil rights, employment, or discrimination actions." Id. The court rationalized
that, although the District of Columbia's position "may be plausible," the District
did not produce enough evidence to persuade the court. Id. at 897-98.
Second, the Covington district court considered the prevailing market rate for
complex federal litigation. Id. at 900. Here, while noting the Laffey Matrix, the
court held that only the inmates, the plaintiffs, had produced sufficient evidence.
Id. Accordingly, the Covington district court awarded the inmates attorney fees at
the rate which they requested, the Laffey Matrix rate. Id. (citing Laffey v. North-
west Airlines, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 746 F.2d 4
(D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1021 (1985)).
In addition, the Covington district court addressed three issues which were not
fully examined by the District of Columbia Circuit in Covington. Id. at 900-03; see
Covington, 57 F.3d at 1110 (discussing fees, but not addressing other two issues).
First, the Covington district court examined the contingency plan according to
which the plaintiffs arranged to compensate the law students. Id. at 901. Here, the
court found that regardless of any contingency plan, the law students' time should
be included in an award. Id. The court agreed that the contingency plan only
differed "in degree," and thus was similar to any other program which pays a law
student a salary. Id.
Next, the Covington district court examined whether to award fees at the cur-
rent or historic rates. Id. at 902. The Covington court held that the District of
Columbia implicitly "conceded" to the use of current rates by not requesting an
annual breakdown of the number of hours expended. Id. The court reasoned
that without these figures, an award of attorney fees using historic rates would be
impossible to compute. Id.
Finally, the Covington district court also reached a decision concerning attor-
ney fees for litigation involving attorney fees. Id. at 903. The court held that the
plaintiffs were entitled to compensation for all hours reasonably spent on the peti-
tion for fees. Id.
135. Id. at 899. The court explained that:
A statistically reliable, well-documented, and extensive survey of the rates cli-
ents pay for a certain sub-market of legal services would be powerfully persua-
sive. Such a survey would collect the rates of a statistically significant
number of lawyers or firms within a legal sub-market, convincing the
court that the survey's scope is broad enough to reflect the market faith-
fully. Such a survey would be sufficiently documented with supporting
affidavits, assuring the court of the accuracy of the survey's data. Lastly,
such a survey would encompass both the high rates that large, prestigious
law firms in the area command for their work in the sub-market and the
lower rates commanded by others for their work in the sub-market. (Ide-
ally, the survey would also indicate what fraction of clients pay which rates
within the sub-market's rate spectrum. That is, the survey would state
what fraction of the sub-market's clients take their cases to high-priced
firms, what fraction to low-priced firms, and what fraction to firms priced
in the middle. This would help the court determine whether any given
rate is typical or aberrant.)
Id.
136. Id. at 898-90. But see Covington, 57 F.3d at 1113 (Henderson, J., dissent-
ing) (citing entire "survey" passage from district court's opinion in Covington in
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cordingly, the district court in Covington awarded the applicants a total of
$363,117.25 in attorney fees.' 3 7 As a result, the District appealed.' 38
IV. ANALYsis: Co VINGTON V. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
This Part examines the District of Columbia Circuit's analysis in Cov-
ington.13 9 In particular, the Section A of this Part offers a narrative review
of the reasoning applied by the Covington court in reaching its conclu-
sions. 140 Alternatively, Section B critically examines the Covington court's
analysis.'
4
'
A. Covington's Determination of a Reasonable Rate
In Covington, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, upon
appeal by the District of Columbia, affirmed three different attorney fees
award motions in one consolidated case. 142 Before beginning its analysis,
however, the circuit court first noted some "principles" of attorney fee
awards emanating from Blum and SOCM.'43 The court then explained
support of conclusion that district court applied correct law, but came to wrong
conclusion).
137. Covington, 839 F. Supp. at 903 (awarding $363,117.25 for litigating merits
of case and $21,380.00 for litigating fee petition). The district court applied the
following rates: the two lead attorneys at a rate of $260.00 per hour; two assisting
attorneys at a rate of $160.00 an hour; the law graduates work at a rate of $85.00 an
hour; and the law students at a rate of $70.00 an hour. Id.
138. Covington, 57 F.3d at 1102; cf Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437(1983) (stating that "request for attorney's fees should not result in a second major
litigation"); NACV, 675 F.2d 1319, 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (noting that "contests
over fees should not be permitted to evolve into exhaustive trial-type
proceedings").
139. For a review of the circuit court's analysis in Covington, see infra notes
142-201 and accompanying text.
140. For a narrative analysis of the circuit court's decision in Covington, see
infra notes 142-77 and accompanying text.
141. For a critical analysis of the circuit court's decision in Covington, see infra
notes 178-201 and accompanying text.
142. Covington, 57 F.3d at 1107. The Covington court based this decision on
an analysis of Supreme Court precedent, Blum, District of Columbia precedent,
SOCM, and statutory interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994). Id. at 1107-12; see
Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984) (interpreting 42 U.S.C 1988(b)); SOCM, 857
F.2d 1516 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc) (same). For the text of section 1988(b), see
supra note 4.
143. Covington, 57 F.3d at 1107. The court cited two cases as sources for these
"principles." Id. First, the Covington court cited to the Supreme Court's decision
in Blum. See Covington, 57 F.3d at 1107 (citing Blum 465 U.S. at 895 (explaining
that Congress intended that "'reasonable fees' under § 1988 are to be calculated
according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community, regardless of
whether plaintiff is represented by private or non-profit counsel")). Next, the Cov-
ington court cited to the District of Columbia's en banc decision in SOCM. Id.
(citing SOCM, 857 F.2d at 1524 (en banc) (holding that "prevailing market rate
method heretofore used in awarding fees to traditional for-profit firms and public
interest legal services organizations shall apply as well to those attorneys who prac-
tice privately and for profit but at reduced rates reflecting non-economic goals")).
29
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that Covington involved a "relatively straightforward application of these
principles."'" Ultimately, the court summarily concluded that under the
Supreme Court's Blum decision and the District of Columbia Circuit's
SOCM decision, "it is quite clear" that the applicants were entitled to an
award. 14 5 Thus, in Covington the circuit court held that the district judges
in the three cases below did not abuse their discretion. 14 6
In reaching this conclusion, the Covington court utilized a two prong
approach in structuring its analysis. 147 First, the court examined "The At-
torneys' Fee Case."1 4 8 Second, the court considered the "Claims in this
Case." 149
1. The Attorneys'Fee Case
In this section of the circuit court's opinion, the Covington court ex-
plained that as a "general matter," the District of Columbia Circuit charac-
terized the Supreme Court's Blum decision as constituting a three-part
analysis. 150 The circuit court noted, however, that the facts in Covington
only required an examination as to the second part-"determination of a
reasonable hourly rate."' 5' The court further explained that to establish a
144. See Covington, 57 F.3d at 1107 (noting that attorneys in present case re-
quested market rates).
145. See id. (concluding that while attorneys at hand either practice privately,
but at reduced rate for non-economic reasons, or have no billing histories, both
are entitled to prevailing market rates).
146. Id.; see Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 901 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en
banc) (stating that "[i]t is common learning that an attorney's fee award by the
District Court will be upset on appeal only if it represents an abuse of discretion"
(emphasis added)).
147. Covington, 57 F.3d at 1107-12. This section is structured in the same
manner as the Covington court's analysis. For a discussion of the circuit court's two
prong analysis in Covington, see infra notes 152-77 and accompanying text.
148. See Covington, 57 F.3d at 1107-10 (offering macro-analysis of attorney fee
awards in general). For a discussion of the Covington courts macro-analysis of attor-
ney fee awards, see infra notes 150-69 and accompanying text.
149. See Covington, 57 F.3d at 1110-12 (conducting a micro-analysis of district
court's attorney fee award in Covington). For a discussion of the Covington court's
micro-analysis of attorney fee awards, see infra notes 170-79 and accompanying
text.
150. Covington, 57 F.3d at 1107. This three prong analysis includes: "(1) de-
termination of the number of hours reasonably expended in litigation; (2) deter-
mination of a reasonable hourly rate or 'lodestar'; and (3) the use of multipliers as
merited." Id. (quoting SOCM, 857 F.2d 1516, 1517 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc)); see
also In re Olson, 884 F.2d 1415, 1423 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (applying same analysis); In
re Donovan, 877 F.2d 982, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (applying same analysis). For a
discussion of the lodestar attorney fees analysis, see supra notes 7-9, 41-42, 64 and
accompanying text.
151. Covington, 57 F.3d at 1107. The Covington court only needed to examine
the reasonable hourly rate prong because the other two prongs were not in dis-
pute. Id. The first prong, determination of the number of hours reasonably ex-
pended was moot because the parties stipulated on this number. Id. at 1106; see
Covington v. District of Columbia, 839 F. Supp. 894, 896 (D.D.C. 1993) (noting
that "parties in this case have already stipulated as to the number of hours counsel
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reasonable hourly rate, fee applicants must show at least three elements:
"the attorneys' billing practices; the attorneys' skill, experience, and repu-
tation; and the prevailing market rates in the relevant community. 152
Next, the Covington court illustrated the requirements needed to es-
tablish each of these three elements. 153 With respect to the first element,
the Covington court held that attorneys who request fees at rates greater
than those they normally charge must produce evidence to show that their
rates are reduced for non-economic or public-spirited reasons. 154 The
Covington court reasoned that this requirement ensures that district courts
will not penalize private, rate-cutting attorneys for their public-spirited-
ness.1 5 5 In addition, the Covington court explained that the burden is on
the fee applicant to produce evidence that the rates in question are in fact
reduced.1 56 Finally, while warning that some attorneys "who cannot com-
mand market rates invariably will have a 'custom' of charging rates below
market," the Covington court held that it is ultimately up to the district
courts to resolve this issue.1 5 7
Continuing its examination, the Covington court next reviewed the
second element-requiring fee applicants to show their skill, experience
and reputation.1 58 Here, the Covington court held that the "prevailing par-
ties must offer evidence to demonstrate their attorneys' experience, skill,
reputation, and the complexity of the case they handled."1 59 The Coving-
have reasonably worked on this litigation"). And the third prong, the use of multi-
pliers, was not raised by the petitioning party. See Covington, 839 F. Supp. at 896
(stating that "plaintiffs are not seeking any enhancement of the lodestar figure").
152. Covington, 57 F.3d at 1107; see Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11
(1984) (noting requirements necessary to establish reasonable hourly rate); SOCM,
857 F.2d at 1519 (same).
153. Covington, 57 F.3d at 1107-10. For a discussion of the burden on a fee
applicant, see supra notes 35-37, 101-05 and accompanying text.
154. Covington, 57 F.3d at 1107; see SOCM, 857 F.2d at 1519 (reviewing claim
of attorneys who "adjusted fee schedules downward from pro bono or quasi public
interest motives to reflect the reduced ability of the client to pay or what the attor-
ney saw as the importance and justice of the client's cause").
155. Covington, 57 F.3d at 1108. The Covington court explained that the en
banc District of Columbia Circuit in SOCM held that: "Congress did not intend the
private but public-spirited rate-cutting attorney to be penalized for his public spirit-
edness by being paid on a lower scale than either his higher priced fellow barrister
from a more established firm or his salaried neighbor at a legal services clinic." Id.
(quoting SOCM, 857 F.2d at 1524).
156. See id. (explaining that "attorney must show that his or her custom of
charging reduced rates is in fact attributable to 'public spiritedness"').
157. Id. The Covington court explained that a district court must weigh the
competing evidence and "determine whether an attorney customarily charges re-
duced rates for non-economic reasons." Id. The court in Covington concluded that
this question is within the "sound discretion of the district court." Id.
158. Id.; see also Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984) (explaining
factors court should consider in determining attorney fees awards).
159. Covington, 57 F.3d at 1108; see SOCM, 857 F.2d at 1521 n.4 (explaining
that District of Columbia Circuit does "not propose ... that all attorneys be remu-
nerated at the same rate, regardless of their competence, experience, and market-
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ton court explained that the Supreme Court required fee applicants to
exhibit evidence to establish that the requested rates are consistent with
rates that similarly skilled and experienced attorneys charge their
clients. 160
The Covington court then addressed the third element-compelling
fee applicants to show the "prevailing market rates in the relevant commu-
nity. ' 16 1 The Covington court noted that the framework for this analysis
requires fee applicants to produce satisfactory evidence, including their
own affidavits, which establish "that the requested rates are in line with
those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reason-
ably comparable skill, experience and reputation." 1 62 Importantly, the
Covington court determined that fee applicants may submit updated ver-
ability .... [rather, the Circuit] only aim[s] to provide that their experience,
competence, and marketability... be reflected in the rate at which they are in fact
remunerated").
160. Covington, 57 F.3d at 1108; see Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n.11 (noting fee
applicants are required to "produce satisfactory evidence-in addition to the attor-
ney's own affidavits-that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in
the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, expe-
rience, and reputation").
161. Covington, 57 F.3d at 1108. The Covington court noted that the Supreme
Court, in Blum, acknowledged that the determination of the market rate is a diffi-
cult assessment. Id. The Court in Blum explained that it recognized that:
[D] etermining an appropriate "market rate" for the services of a lawyer is
inherently difficult. Market prices of commodities and most services are
determined by supply and demand. In this traditional sense there is no
such thing as a prevailing market rate for the service of lawyers in a partic-
ular community. The type of services rendered by lawyers, as well as their
experience, skill, and reputation, varies extensively-even within a law
firm. Accordingly, the hourly rates of lawyers in private practice also vary
widely.
Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n.11; see also NACV, 675 F.2d 1319, 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(stating that "complexity of the market for legal services does not ... reduce the
importance of fixing the prevailing hourly rate in each particular case with a fair
degree of accuracy").
162. Covington, 57 F.3d at 1109 (citing Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n.11). The Cov-
ington court explained that the Supreme Court established this framework, in
Blum. Id. The Supreme Court in Blum explained that:
To inform and assist the court in the exercise of its discretion, the burden
is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence-in addition to
the attorney's own affidavits-that the requested rates are in line with
those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of rea-
sonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation. A rate determined
in this way is normally deemed to be reasonable, and is referred to-for
convenience-as the prevailing market rate.
Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n.11 (noting that "rates charged in private representations
may afford relevant comparisons"); see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 286
(1989) (stating that "reasonable attorney's fee under § 1988 is one calculated on
the basis of rates and practices prevailing in the relevant market ... and one that
grants the successful civil rights plaintiff a 'fully compensatory fee,' ... comparable
to what 'is traditional with attorneys compensated by a fee-paying client"' (quoting
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983))).
[Vol. 41: p. 825
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sions of the Laffey Matrix 163 or the United States Attorney's Office Ma-
trix' 64 to demonstrate this element.1 65 The Covington court reasoned that
while matrices are "crude," they still provide a useful starting point. 166
Finally, the Covington court explained that once the fee applicants
meet their burden, the defendants may challenge the fee application.1 67
Arriving at this conclusion, however, the Covington court noted that the
defendant's burden is just as stringent as the fee applicant's burden. 68
Thus, the Covington court reaffirmed that the defendant must "provide
specific contrary evidence tending to show that a lower rate would be
appropriate."
169
2. The Claims in Covington
The circuit court in Covington began its analysis by explaining that its
"review function in this case is limited" because "district courts act with a
163. See Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 354, 371 (D.D.C. 1983)
(citing with approval proposed fee matrix). For a discussion of Laffey and the Laf-
fey Matrix, see supra note 112 and accompanying text.
164. See Covington, 57 F.3d at 1105 n.14 (noting that "U.S. Attorney's Office
developed its fee matrix by adding the Consumer Price Index increase for the
Washington, D.C., metropolitan area to the prior year's rate and rounding
upwards if the sum is within $3 of the next $5 multiple").
165. Id. at 1109. But see NACV, 675 F.2d at 1325 (explaining that "[t]o be
useful an affidavit stating an attorney's opinion as to the market rate should be as
specific as possible" (emphasis added)).
166. Covington, 57 F.3d at 1109. The Covington court noted the district court's
dissatisfaction with the Laffey Matrix in Galloway v. Superior Court. Id. at 1109
n.18; see Galloway v. Superior Court, No. CIVA.91-0644, 1994 WL 162410, at *3 n.1
(D.D.C. Apr. 21, 1994) (stating that "[t]he Court accepts as credible evidence the
[Laffey] Matrix, but nonetheless would hope that a more complete breakdown and
study of rates could be compiled for future use in attorneys' fee awards").
167. Covington, 57 F.3d at 1109; see Blum, 465 U.S. at 897 (emphasizing that
"[w]hen . . . the applicant for a fee has carried his burden of showing that the
claimed rate and number of hours are reasonable, the resulting product is pre-
sumed to be the reasonable fee contemplated by § 1988").
168. Covington, 57 F.3d at 1109-10. For a discussion of the burden on the
party opposing an attorney fees application, see supra note 106 and accompanying
text.
169. Covington, 57 F.3d at 1110 (quoting NACV, 675 F.2d at 1326). The Cov-
ington court explained that the "Government's burden in rebuttal is not without
demands." Id. at 1109. The Covington court reiterated the explanation of the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit in National Ass'n of Concerned Veterans v. Secretary of Defense.
Id. The NACVcourt held that:
Once the fee applicant has provided support for the requested rate, the
burden falls on the Government to go forward with evidence that the rate
is erroneous. And when the Government attempts to rebut the case for a
requested rate, it must do so by equally specific countervailing evidence.
Although there may be occasions in which the applicant's showing is so
weak that the Government may without more simply challenge the rate as
unsubstantiated, in the normal case the Government must either accede
to the applicant's requested rate or provide specific contrary evidence tend-
ing to show that a lower rate would be appropriate.
NACV, 675 F.2d at 1326 (emphasis added).
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real measure of discretion in granting a fee award under section 1988."170
The Covington court then determined that the plaintiffs "clearly met their
burden and their requested rates were properly accorded a presumption
of reasonableness."'17 1 In addition, the Covington court explained that the
District offered insufficient evidence to meet their burden of refuting the
proposed reasonable rate.1 72
The circuit court in Covington rejected the District's position that the
district court erred for three reasons.175 First, the Covington court held
that the District offered insufficient evidence to support its claim that the
requested rates were higher than the established rate for attorneys exper-
ienced in litigating complex federal cases.174 Second, the Covington court
discarded the District's claim that the fee applicants were only entitled to
rates they regularly charge.1 75 Third, the Covington court found that the
district court correctly rejected the District's position that the prevailing
170. Covington, 57 F.3d at 1110; see Blum, 465 U.S. at 902 n.19 (noting that
"district court is expressly empowered to exercise discretion in determining
whether an award is to be made and if so its reasonableness"); Kattan v. District of
Columbia, 995 F.2d 274, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (explaining that "district court's
discretion as to the proper hourly rate to award counsel should not be upset absent
clear misapplication of legal principles, arbitrary fact finding, or unprincipled dis-
regard for the record evidence"); Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 901 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (en banc) (stating that "[i]t is common learning that an attorney's fee
award by the District Court will be upset on appeal only if it represents an abuse of
discretion"); see also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983) (noting that
limited standard of review is "appropriate in view of the district court's superior
understanding of the litigation and the desirability of avoiding frequent appellate
review of what essentially are factual matters").
171. Covington, 57 F.3d at 1110; see Blum, 465 U.S. at 897 (emphasizing that
"[w]hen ... the applicant for a fee has carried his burden of showing that the
claimed rate and number of hours are reasonable, the resulting product is pre-
sumed to be the reasonable fee contemplated by § 1988").
172. Covington, 57 F.3d at 1110-12. For a discussion of the burden on the
party opposing an attorney fees application, see supra note 106 and accompanying
text.
173. Covington, 57 F.3d at 1110-12. For a discussion of the these reasons, see
infra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
174. Covington, 57 F.3d at 1110-11. The Covington court noted that the District
only submitted one declaration, from an assistant deputy, in support of its claim.
Id. at 1111. The Covington court found that this affidavit only recounted cases "in-
apposite to the case at bar." Id. Furthermore, the Covington court stressed that
that majority of the cases in the affidavit never even requested prevailing market
rates. Id.
175. Id. The Covington court summarized the District's argument as: the
"plaintiffs are only entitled to the rates they regularly charge, i.e., that these rates
are in fact the prevailing market rates." Id. The Covington court, however, then
explained that the District of Columbia Circuit rejected this line of approach in
SOCM. Id.; see SOCM, 857 F.2d 1516, 1521 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that "result
sought by plaintiffs, that is a fee award based on prevailing market rates rather
than the actual rates of [plaintiffs' attorneys], is not only not inconsistent with the
express intent of Congress, but rather accomplishes Congress' express goals").
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market only includes civil rights, employment or discrimination actions. 176
The Covington court reasoned that these conclusions were consistent with
Congress's intent in enacting section 1988(b). 1 77
B. Critical Analysis: Covington Clouds the Once Clear Burden of Proof Under
42 U.S.C. Section 1988
In Covington, the District of Columbia Circuit failed to articulate a
sound opinion for three reasons.1 7 8 First, the Covington court erroneously
applied existing Supreme Court and District of Columbia Circuit prece-
dent.1 79 Second, the Covington court failed to consider precedent from
other circuits which have faced similar issues. 180 Third, the Covington
court erred in the manner in which it consolidated the three lower court
cases. 181 This Section examines each of these areas, and attempts to pro-
vide more guidance than did the Covington court.
First, while the Covington court correctly reaffirmed Blum's holding
that reasonable fees are based on the prevailing market rate, the court
erred in its determination of the market rate.1 82 In particular, the Coving-
ton court properly isolated the three elements necessary to determine the
market rate, but failed to require the type of specific evidence that the
Supreme Court necessitated in Blum.1 83 In short, Blum requires specific
176. See Covington, 57 F.3d at 1111 (noting that even "assuming, arguendo, the
existence of such a submarket, the trial court found no evidence that submarket
rates are lower than the prevailing rates in the broader legal market").
177. Id.; see Blum, 465 U.S. at 893 (quoting S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 6 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5913 (stating that "[ilt is intended that the
amount of fees awarded under [section 1988(b)] be governed by the same stan-
dards which prevail in other types of equally complex Federal litigation, such as
antitrust cases and not be reduced because the rights may be nonpecuniary in
nature")); see also SOCM, 857 F.2d at 1521 (stating that "Congress after all did not
simply express its intent that the fees would attract counsel, but rather that they
would be 'adequate to attract competent counsel"' (quoting S. REP. No. 94-1011,
at 6 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CA.N. 5908, 5913))).
178. For the Seventh Circuit's disposition of Barrow I, an opinion that clearly
articulates the issues, see supra notes 73-84 and accompanying text.
179. For a discussion of the Covington court's misapplication of Supreme
Court and District of Columbia Circuit precedent, see infra notes 185-88 and ac-
companying text.
180. For a discussion of the potential application of other circuit precedent
on the Covington facts, see infra notes 189-93 and accompanying text.
181. For a discussion of the court's failure to recognize facts distinguishing
the three consolidated cases, see infra notes 194-201 and accompanying text.
182. Covington, 57 F.3d at 1107; see Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 (stating that Con-
gress intended "'reasonable fees' under section 1988(b) . . . to be calculated ac-
cording to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community, regardless of
whether plaintiff is represented by private or non-profit counsel").
183. See Covington, 57 F.3d at 1107 (noting that "fee applicant's burden in
establishing a reasonable hourly rate entails a showing of at least three elements:
the attorneys' billing practices; the attorneys' skill, experience, and reputation;
and the prevailing market rates in the relevant community").
1996] NOTE
35
Sutor: Covington v. District of Columbia: Judicial Clouding of a Once Cl
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
evidence, not the existence of a matrix that rigidly stratifies rates accord-
ing to years of practice.1 84
In addition, the Covington court failed to correctly apply existing Dis-
trict of Columbia case law. 185 Specifically, under NACV"[a]n applicant is
required to provide specific evidence of the prevailing community rate for
the type of work for which he seeks an award."1 86 The fee applicant's
motion in Covington, however, rested entirely on the merits of matrices
depicting rates in the expansive "complex federal litigation" market, and
failed to articulate the specific evidence required by NACV 18 7 Accord-
ingly, because the fee applicants in Covington offered only generalized evi-
dence, it appears as though they failed to satisfy their burden of producing
"specific evidence."1 88
Second, the District of Columbia Circuit's opinion in Covington is no-
ticeably void of any precedent from other circuits that may have afforded
the court guidance. 189 For example, without specific evidence to support
184. See Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n.l1 (noting that fee applicants can meet bur-
den by submitting their own affidavits to show that "requested rates are in line with
those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably com-
parable skill, experience, and reputation" (emphasis added)). Thus, while considera-
tion of an attorney's years out of law school may help a trial court to determine an
attorney's reasonable hourly rate, this consideration cannot be a substitute for an
examination of attorney's rates with comparable skill, experience and reputation.
The Covington court, however, did in fact substitute this one facet inquiry, when it
relied on a matrix which structured rates based on years out of law school, in lieu
of Blum's three prong analysis. See Covington, 57 F.3d at 1109 (relying on Laffey
Matrix).
185. Covington, 57 F.3d at 1109. While the District of Columbia in NACVre-
quired fee applicants to produce specific evidence, the Covington court does not
mention specific evidence until referencing the District's burden of rebuttal. Id.;
see NACV, 675 F.2d 1319, 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (noting that applicant's affidavit
should be "as specific as possible").
186. NACV 675 F.2d at 1325. In addition to requiring specific evidence, the
NACVcourt expressly rejected the use of "generalized and conclusory" evidence.
Id.; see Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 892 (D.C. Cir. 1980 (en banc) (stating
that "reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work").
The Covington court, however, employed and relied on the very type of evidence
the NACV court specifically discounted; a generalized matrix offering conclusory
evidence that an attorney's time is worth so many dollars per year out of law
school. See Covington, 57 F.3d at 1109 (relying on Laffey Matrix). For a discussion
of the NACV court's decision, see supra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
187. See Covington, 57 F.3d at 1112 (Henderson, J., dissenting) (emphasizing
that "applicants have not met this burden because they rest their applications en-
tirely on evidence of rates in the broad market of 'complex federal litigation' that
provides no basis for the district court to determine the rate prevailing for the
specific type of work performed by them").
188. See NAC, 675 F.2d at 1325 (rejecting fee applicant's employment of
"generalized and conclusory" evidence). For a discussion of the type of evidence
necessary to support an attorney's fees application, see supra notes 101-05 and ac-
companying text.
189. See Covington, 57 F.3d at 1106-12 (analyzing District of Columbia reason-
able rate case law, but not considering other circuit case law). Although case law
from other circuits was not binding on the Covington court, this case law could have
860 [Vol. 41: p. 825
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their claim, it appears as though the fee applicants were seeking premium
rates.19 0 The Seventh Circuit had already addressed a similar issue, how-
ever, in Barrow I, and rejected the award of such premium rates. 19 In
doing so, the Barrow Icourt explained that an award of fees at a "premium
rate for civil rights cases, applicable only when the other side is paying,
looks like nothing so much as a disguised multiplier."1 92 The Barrow I
court concluded that because the Supreme Court in City of Burlington v.
Dague rejected the use of risk multipliers, the use of premium rates must
also be rejected.193 The Covington court, however, declined to even men-
tion the Seventh Circuit's decision in Barrow I, and thus neglected to take
advantage of this persuasive authority.
Finally, because the Covington court failed to recognize material fac-
tual differences in the three consolidated cases, the court erred in limiting
its review to the facts of the district court's decision in Covington, while
ignoring the facts of Sexcius and Galloway.194 Specifically, the Covington
analysis operated under the assertion that because the fee applicants in all
three cases charged reduced rates, their billing histories were irrele-
vant.1 95 This assertion, however, is unsupported and inconsistent with the
records in Sexcius and Galloway.1 96 Specifically, in Sexcius, the fee appli-
cant quoted a maximum rate of $187.50 per hour, while in Galloway the
applicant proved that she had commanded $200 per hour.1 9 7 Yet, neither
offered persuasive guidance. Kreuzer v. American Academy of Periodontology,
735 F.2d 1479, 1490 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1984). As the Kreuzer court explained:
When this court first considers a particular legal issue it will look to dis-
cover whether another circuit court has already resolved the issue. Prior
resolution of an issue by another court will be taken into account. Such
prior resolution of an issue by another circuit, however, is not binding on
this circuit. It is, though, persuasive authority which should not be com-
pletely ignored.
Id. (emphasis added).
190. See Barrow I, 977 F.2d 1100, 1105 (7th Cir. 1992) (rejecting use of pre-
mium rates); see also NACV, 675 F.2d at 1325 (requiring specific evidence). For a
discussion of the specific evidence requirement of the NACVcourt, see supra notes
101-05 and accompanying text.
191. Barrow 1, 977 F.2d at 1105. For a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's dis-
position of Barrow I, see supra notes 73-84 and accompanying text.
192. Barrow I, 977 F.2d at 1105.
193. Id.; see City of Burlington v. Dague, 550 U.S. 557, 565-66 (1992) (refusing
to allow district court to enhance attorney's fee award because of added risk); see
also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (stating that "request for attorney's
fees should not result in a second major litigation").
194. See Covington, 57 F.3d at 1103 (consolidating three lower court rulings
into one appeal). But see id. at 1114 (Henderson,J., dissenting) (criticizing Coving-
ton court's failure to examine all relevant facts).
195. See id. at 1108 (noting possibility that some attorneys may have lower
than market rates, but not addressing whether Covington attorneys had lower
rates).
196. Id. at 1114 (Henderson, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Galloway and
Sexcius, see supra note 126.
197. Covington, 57 F.3d at 1114 (Henderson,J., dissenting). Judge Henderson
explained that: "Together, NACV and SOCM instruct that a lawyer's usual hourly
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of these two applicants offered any evidence that these rates were reduced
for non-economic reasons. 198
Nevertheless, the Covington court neglected to acknowledge that the
NACV court had found that an attorney's non-reduced rate is the most
probative evidence of a reasonable rate.' 9 9 As Judge Henderson ex-
plained in her Covington dissent, resorting "to a matrix to determine a
reasonable rate is ... appropriate only if a lawyer's ordinary rate is so re-
duced. °2 00 Accordingly, because these rates were not reduced, the Coving-
ton court should not have employed the Laffey Matrix, regardless of its
questionable utility. 20 1
V. COVzNCTOA)S IMPACT ON FUTURE LITIGATION IN THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA CIRCUIT AND BEYOND
The District of Columbia Circuit's adjudication of Covington signals a
shift of the burden of proof in all petitions for attorney fees based on fee
shifting statutes. 2 0 2 Although Covington only concerned section 1988's fee
shifting provisions, its holding is applicable to all fee shifting statutes re-
quiring "reasonable fees."' 20 3 As a result, Covington's questionable decision
will not only infect future section 1988 cases, but may also plague the en-
tire spectrum of cases implementing "reasonable" fee shifting provisions.
Because the Covington court allowed the fee applicants to meet their
burden of proof by submitting an updated Laffey Matrix, the court re-
lieved them of their duty to supply "specific evidence." 20 4 Thus, the Coy-
rate remains the most probative evidence of a reasonable rate to award him under
a fee-shifting statute unless that rate does not fairly reflect the value of his services
because it is a 'reduced tate reflecting non-economic goals."' Id. (Henderson,J.,
dissenting) (quoting SOCM, 857 F.2d 1516, 1524 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
198. See id. (Henderson, J., dissenting) (explaining that "[n]either indicated
that those rates had been reduced for non-economic reasons").
199. See NACV, 675 F.2d 1319, 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (noting that trial courts
may require fee applicants to submit actual billing practice during "relevant time
period"); Kattan v. District of Columbia, 995 F.2d 274, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (ex-
plaining that "attorney's usual billing rate is presumptively the reasonable rate");
see also Goos v. National Ass'n of Realtors, 997 F.2d 1565, 1569 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(relying on record of attorney's customary rate).
200. Covington, 57 F.3d at 1114 (Henderson, J., dissenting). Judge Hender-
son, however, qualified her statement by explaining that if a trial court utilizes a
matrix, it "must be based on 'specific evidence' of 'the type of work' for which the
lawyer seeks an award." Id. (quoting NACV, 675 F.2d at 1325).
201. Id. (Henderson, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the Laffey Matrix's
questionable utility, see infra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
202. Covington, 57 F.3d at 1113 (Henderson, J., dissenting) (stating that
"[w] here the district court committed error, however, was in placing the burden of
proof on the District, not the applicants").
203. See City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 563 (1992) (noting that
Supreme Court interpretation of what is "reasonable" under one fee shifting stat-
ute applies "uniformly to all" fee shifting statutes).
204. For a discussion of the burden on a fee applicant, see supra notes 35-37,
101-05 and accompanying text.
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ington court established a mechanism to secure the Laffey Matrix's
premium rates, which only requires the fee-seeking applicants to meet two
simple requirements. 2 0 5 First, attorneys seeking their fees need to claim
that their rates are reduced. 20 6 The Covington court made this require-
ment easy to meet because it considered the numbers in the Laffey Matrix
as the market rate.20 7 Therefore, under the court's skewed logic, any rate
below the applicable Laffey Matrix rate must be reduced.20 8
Second, under Covington, the fee-seeking applicants need to establish
that their rates are reduced for non-economic reasons.20 9 Again, the Cov-
ington court made this requirement effortless, as the court's decision al-
lows fee applicants to submit self-serving affidavits that assert this
position.2 10 Because Covington only requires these two readily-met condi-
tions, the court essentially fixed the floor for determining reasonable rates
at the Laffey Matrix figures.2 1 1
205. See Appellant's Brief at 28, Covington v. District of Columbia, 57 F.3d
1101 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Nos. 94-7014 & 94-7022) (noting that under Laffey fee ap-
plicant is only faced with two requirements).
206. Covington, 57 F.3d at 1114 (Henderson,J., dissenting). Judge Henderson
explained that trial courts must require fee applicants to do more than just ask for
an award. Id. She emphasized that to the contrary, the fee applicant "must meet a
factually demanding burden." Id.
207. See Appellant's Brief at 28, Covington (Nos. 94-7014 & 94-7022) (explain-
ing that "this is rather easy to do because a reduced rate is any rate below the
applicable experience rate in the Laffey [M]atrix").
208. See id. The Covington court failed to recognize that a matrix may not
properly represent each attorney's skill reputation and experience. See Bum 465
U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984) (noting that "requested rates [must] be in line with
those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably
comparable skill, experience, and reputation").
209. See Covington, 57 F.3d at 1107 (stating that "attorneys must offer some
evidence that they charge reduced rates for public-spirited or noneconomic
reasons").
210. See id. at 1104 (relying on fee applicants own affidavits asserting that they
charge reduced rates for non-economic reasons).
211. See Appellant's Brief at 28, Covington (Nos. 94-7014 & 94-7022). The Ap-
pellants unsuccessfully contended that:
What this means, of course, is that the rates contained in the Laffey matrix
have become the floor for determining "reasonable" hourly rates in fee-
shifting cases, despite the fact that attorneys will otherwise charge lower,
competitive, market-based rates. All plaintiffs' attorneys litigating cases
like the ones here, and whose rates are below the Laffey matrix rates, will
now request and be awarded much higher rates based solely on the expe-
rience group into which they fall. These rates will be sought and awarded
irrespective of whether counsel's qualifications, skills, and performance
approximate those of lead counsel in Laffey and irrespective of whether
their cases are as complex as Laffey.
This rule and its results contradict the decisions of the Supreme
Court and this Court.
Id. at 29; see Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n.11 (noting that while "[m]arket prices of
commodities ... are determined by supply and demand.., there is no such thing
as a prevailing market rate for the service of lawyers in a particular community").
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In addition to shifting the burden of proof, the Covington court's deci-
sion may also increase litigation involving attorney fee shifting provi-
sions.2 12 The prospect of recovering fees at the Laffey Matrix rates may
induce prospective fee applicants to allege that their fees are reduced. In
addition, Covington allows attorneys with billing histories to disregard these
records and seek the higher Laffey Matrix rates.2 13 As a result, because
losing parties are likely to resist paying fees at these higher rates, courts
may increasingly find themselves considering whether the relevant rates
are actually reduced.2 1
4
Finally, while matrices may provide probative evidence when an attor-
ney has no billing history, their utility sharply decreases when the amount
the fee applicant can command in the market is established. 21 5 Because
the Covington court disregards attorneys' billing histories, however, fee ap-
plicants in the District of Columbia are afforded the benefit of recovering
fees at premium rates, without the requirements imposed by the Supreme
Court in Blum.2 16 Thus, until the Supreme Court examines the ideology
offered in Covington, fee applicants in the District of Columbia may receive
the very "windfall" Congress expressly warned against.2 17
212. See Shelton, supra note 22, at 489 (explaining that policy behind section
1988 was to increase civil rights litigation). The Covington decision may induce
attorney's to increasingly submit the Laffey Matrix in order to receive the higher
rates. More litigation may arise, however, as the losing parties will most likely op-
pose the higher Laffey rates. Thus, these parties will want the opportunity to show
a court why the matrix rates are not appropriate. Cf Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461
U.S. 424, 437 (1983) (emphasizing that ideally parties will come to agreement on
amount of fee, without need for second major litigation).
213. Covington, 57 F.3d at 1114 (Henderson, J., dissenting) (noting that ma-
jority ignored Sexcius and Galloway's fee applicant's prior billing histories).
214. See Shelton, supra note 22, at 489 (noting that "[t] he hart of section 1988
is that 'the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... reasonable
attorney's fees"'). As a result of the possible increase in litigation, courts in the
future may more frequently be asked to determine whether the requested rates are
reduced.
215. Covington, 57 F.3d at 1114 (Henderson, J., dissenting) (explaining that
"lawyer's usual hourly rate remains the most probative evidence of a reasonable
rate to award him under a feeshifting statute unless that rate does not fairly reflect
the value of his services because it is a 'reduced rate reflecting non-economic
goals"' (quoting SOCM, 857 F.2d 1516, 1524 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
216. Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n.l1. The Supreme Court in Blum explained that:
To inform and assist the court in the exercise of its discretion, the burden
is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence-in addition to the
attorney's own affidavits-that the requested rates are in line with those
prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably
comparable skill, experience and reputation.
Id. (emphasis added).
217. S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 6 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908,
5913 (explaining that Congress approved "[t] hese [particular] cases [which] have
resulted in fees which are adequate to attract competent counsel, but which [have]
... not produce[d] windfalls to attorneys").
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VI. CONCLUSION
In Covington v. District of Columbia, the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia attempted to follow the Supreme Court's holding in
Blum v. Stenson,218 and the District of Columbia Circuit's similar holding
in SOCM, 2 1 9 in which the courts determined that public-spirited attorneys
should not be penalized for their contributions to society. 220 The Coving-
ton court, however, took this concept of protecting public-spirited attor-
neys to an extreme. As a result of the Covington court's over-zealous
attempt to facilitate public-spirited attorneys, the court created a channel
for other attorneys to exploit. In short, regardless of whether the particu-
lar attorneys in Covington were sufficiently acting in a public-spirited man-
ner, the court's failure to require specific evidence may only serve to
entice attorneys less dedicated to the public welfare to seek the same re-
wards once reserved for the noblest of counselors.22 1
Andrew P. Sutor, IV
218. 465 U.S. 886 (1984). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's disposi-
tion of Blum, see supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
219. 857 F.2d 1516, 1525 (D.C. Cir. 1988). For a discussion of the District of
Columbia Circuit's decision in SOCM, see supra notes 107-12 and accompanying
text.
220. For a discussion of the Supreme Court and the District of Columbia's
efforts to accommodate public spirited attorneys, see supra notes 39-41,107-12 and
accompanying text
221. SOCM, 857 F.2d at 1524 (emphasizing that "Congress did not intend the
private but public-spirited rate-cutting attorney to be penalized for his public spirit-
edness by being paid on a lower scale than either his higher priced fellow barrister
from a more established firm or his salaried neighbor at a legal services clinic").
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